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FREEDOM OF FISHING IN DECLINE: THE
FISHERY CONSERVATION AND
MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 AND THE
IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN
G. KEVIN JONES*
We live in a period of uncontrolled and accelerated change, an
age in which technology has raced ahead and in which hallowed
social values have tumbled... We live in an age of paradox: an
age in which the politician has been straining after the scientist
and technologist, and in which the latter have been trying to un-
derstand the social consequences of the innovations to which
their work has led. The world is clearly living through aperiod in
which the aims ofpolitics and the outcome of scientific endeavor
appear to clash.'
On March 1, 1977, the United States enacted the Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA).2 On the author-
ity of this Congressional enactment3 the United States unilaterally
claimed exclusive management authority4 over all fish, except high-
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This article is an expression of the author's personal opinions and does not represent the
opinions, policies or positions of the Department of the Interior or its officials.
1. Quote by Sir Solly Zuckerman (1971) in Alverson, Management ofthe Ocean's Liv-
ing Resources." An Essay Review, 3 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 99 (1975) (emphasis added). For
a thoughtful discussion on natural resource decision making see Young, Natural Resources
Policy. A Modest Pleafor PoliticalAnalsis, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 183 (1980).
2. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1882 (West Supp. 1980) [hereinafter cited as FCMA]. H.R.
200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 208 to 101
on October 9, 1975, and passed the Senate in lieu of S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), on
January 28, 1976. President Ford signed the 200-mile zone into law on April 13, 1976.
3. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1811 (West Supp. 1980).
4. Id. § 1812 states that:
The United States shall exercise exclusive fishery management authority, in the
manner provided for in this [Act], over the following:
(1) All fish within the fishery conservation zone.
(2) All anadromous species throughout the migratory range of each such species
beyond the fishery conservation zone; except that such management authority shall
not extend to such species during the time they are found within any foreign na-
tion's territorial sea or fishery conservation zone (or the equivalent), to the extent
that such sea or zone is recognized by the United States.
(3) All Continental Shelf fishery resources beyond the fishery conservation zone.
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ly migratory species, 5 within 200 miles from its coasts.6 This exten-
sion of national jurisdiction, intended to protect threatened
contiguous fisheries,7 has special implications for Japan, a major
maritime nation8 and close ally of the United States.9 Japan de-
pends on continued access to United States fishing grounds, espe-
cially the rich harvest off the coast of Alaska, as a source for food.
Passage of the FCMA threatens continued Japanese access to
United States fishing grounds.
The Law of the Sea is undergoing fundamental changes' 0 as a
result of the increase in newly independent states;"I rising national-
5. Id. § 1813. The FCMA defines "highly migratory species" as "species of tuna
which, in the course of their life cycle, spawn and migrate over great distances in waters of
the oceans." Id. § 1802(14). In addition, the definition of "fish" excludes "highly migratory
species." Id. § 1802(6). Thus, the United States does not claim any management authority
over tuna, even while they are within the 200-mile zone.
6. Id. § 1811 provides that:
There is established a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States to
be known as the fishery conservation zone. The inner boundary of the fishery con-
servation zone is a line coterminous with the seaward boundary of each of the
coastal States, and the outer boundary of such zone is a line drawn in such a man-
ner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured.
7. Although Congress placed blame for the depletion of United States fishery resources
on extensive foreign fishing, it recognized that the depressed condition of offshore marine
resources was also attributable to inadequate fishery conservation and management regula-
tions. With the enactment of the FCMA, Congress declared:
As a consequence of increased fishing pressure and because of the inadequacy of
fishery conservation and management practices and controls (A) certain stocks of
such fish have been overfished to the point where their survival is threatened, and
(B) other such stocks have been so substantially reduced in number that they could
become similarly threatened.
Id. § 1801(a)(2).
8. See generally Oda, Transportation ofJapanese Seaborne Trade and Related Laws and
Regulations, 6 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 237 (1979).
9. See generally Hummel, The Foundation of U.S. -Japan Ties. Common Interests and
Shared Values, 75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 582 (November 8, 1976).
10. An unprecedented rate of change in the past several decades has had an impact on
the operations of international and national institutions. Nations are caught in situations
that demand wholesale changes in their social institutions in order to deal with the present
complex technological, economic, and political relationships.
Although change is not new to human experience, the speed of and the need for change
in contemporary society presents a new social challenge. As a scholar on social change ob-
served: "If the human race is to survive it will have to change its way of thinking more in the
next 25 years than it has done in the last 25,000 years." G. JONES, PLANNED ORGANIZA-
TIONAL CHANGE 3 (1969).
11. As a consequence of the large number of newly independent States, memberships in
international organizations have significantly increased, diminishing the political power
which enabled the'Great Powers to dominate these organizations. Kildow, The Law ofthe
Sea- Alliances and Divisive Issues in International Ocean Negotiations, II SAN DIEGO L. REV.
558, 559 (1974).
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ism in the older, more developed, nations;' 2 world population
growth; '3 heightened awareness of the potential for wealth from the
oceans;' 4  and the technological capabilities to develop that
wealth.' 5 While much of the rate of change is attributable to scien-
tific discovery and technological innovation, many of these changes
reflect the emergence of a new world order.' 6 International ocean
negotiations 7 present a real confrontation between developed and
developing nations as well as a symbolic attempt to alter traditional
patterns of resource distribution and international law.'8
12. The rising nationalism in the developed countries and the decline in the interna-
tional economic position of the United States have produced an emphasis on domestic devel-
opment over foreign programs, resulting in a gradual withdrawal of foreign aid
commitments. Id. at 559.
13. Gaither & Strand, The Fishing Conservation and Management Act q(1976. Economic
Issues Associated with Foreign Fishing Fees and Foreign Allocations, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L. 135 (1978).
The world's population by the turn of the century will be six billion and the strain on the
earth's resources to sustain such numbers will be enormous. This is illustrated by the fact
that in 1950 only six major cities had more than five million people but in the year 2000 there
will be sixty, forty-five of them in developing countries. Over ninety percent of the popula-
tion increase will be in the developing countries so that four out of every five people will be
living in less-developed areas of the world.
World population growth could have a dramatic effect upon international politics. The
forty-two million population of Egypt, the Arab country on which the United States places
hopes for Middle East stability, is expected to double in twenty years. Muslims, who have
one of the highest birthrates in the world, will account for one-fourth of the world's popula-
tion by the year 2000. In Soviet Central Asia politically restless Muslims will number one-
fourth or one-third of the total Soviet population by the year 2000. Arabs in Israel proper
and Israeli-occupied lands will outnumber Jews by the turn of the century. World popula-
tion growth will continue to exert an influence over international maritime matters as coun-
tries increase their efforts to tap ocean resources to meet rising domestic needs and
expectations. The Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 11, 1980, at 12-13.
14. Kildow, supra note 11, at 559. See Pontecorvo & Mesnik, The Wealth of the Oceans
and the Law ofthe Sea.- Some Preliminary Observations, 11 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 679 (1974).
15. Kildow, supra note 11, at 559.
16. Juda, UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order, 7 OCEAN DEv. &
INT'L L. 211, 223 (1979).
17. As the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea illustrates, the uses of the
oceans and ownership of vast marine resources present numerous complex issues. Interna-
tional standards must be formulated to deal with: the breadth of the territorial sea; freedom
of transit through, over, and under international straits; access to, as well as revenue from,
mining of minerals under the sea; a means of compelling settlement of disputes; marine
pollution; coastal State jurisdiction in an economic resource zone over living and non-living
resources, including oil and gas deposits within and beyond the zone; and scientific research.
Prospects for an acceptable international agreement on the Law of the Sea are discussed in
Breaux, The Diminishing Prospectsfor an Acceptable Law ofthe Sea Treaty, 19 VA. J. INT'L
L. 257 (1979) and Goldberg, State ofthe Negotiations on the Law ofthe Sea, 31 HASTIN;S
L.J. 1091 (1980). For an introduction to the LOS negotiations see McWhinney, The Codfy-
ing Conference as an Instrument of International Law-Making: From the 'Old' Law ofthe Sea
to the Wew', 3 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 301 (1974-75).
18. Developing nations maintain that customary international law is a remnant of colo-
Vol. I11
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One of the most significant events in the recent history of
man's use of the oceans has been the accelerated exploitation of its
living resources. Since World War II, the world catch of fish has
increased considerably,' 9 from seventeen million metric tons in
1948,20 to sixty-eight million metric tons in 196821 and an estimated
100 million metric tons in 1980.22 World demand for fish by the
year 2000 will be approximately 400 million metric tons, or about
six times the present harvest of living resources from the oceans.23
While the total world fish catch has more than tripled since
World War 11,24 the United States' commercial catch has remained
relatively stable, fluctuating between 2.0 and 2.2 million tons.25
This has resulted in a decline of the United States' position from
second in 1956 to sixth in 1970 among the fishing nations.26 While
the total volume of catch by the United States has remained con-
stant, American consumption of seafoods has grown rapidly result-
ing in the importation of substantial quantities of fish products.27
nial imperialism and is therefore not binding on the newly independent States of the Third
World who did not participate in the formulation of customary international law. The emer-
gence of new States within the international community has produced a diversity of interests
and these new States have formed international associations, such as the Group of 77, to
implement their needs. Thus, developing nations frequently view the traditional law of the
sea as serving primarily the interests of the colonial maritime powers. Nelson, The Emerging
New Law of the Sea, 42 MOD. L. REV. 42 (1979).
19. Excluding whales, the total catch of fish products was approximately 1.5-2.0 million
metric tons in 1850; 4.0 million metric tons in 1900; and 10 million metric tons in 1930.
Eisenbud, Understanding the International Fisheries Debate, 4 NAT. RESOURCES L. 19, 20
(1971). See also Chapman, Food From the Sea and Public Policy, in OCEAN RESOURCES AND
PUBLIC POLICY 64 (T. English ed. 1973).
20. Alexander, New Approaches to Control of Ocean Resources, in INTERNATIONAL RE-
LATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF OCEAN SPACE 68 (R. Wirsing ed. 1974).
21. Eisenbud, supra note 19, at 20.
22. It has been estimated that 100'million tons is the maximum number of fish capable
of being harvested from the oceans without biological harm to world breeding stocks.
MARINE FISHERIES CONSERVATION ACT OF 1975, H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.
33 (1975), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 593, 606 [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT].
23. Schram, Proposed International Fishery Regimes and the Accommodation of Major
Interests, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEEDS AND INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 130
(L. Alexander ed. 1972).
24. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 31, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 603.
25. Id. at 35, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 607.
26. In terms of annual catch, the six leading nations in 1956 were Japan, the United
States, China, the Soviet Union, Norway, and Peru in that order. In 1970, however, they
were Peru, Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Norway, and the United States. Alexander,
supra note 20, at 68-69.
27. In 1950 the United States imported only 23.4 percent of its seafood while in 1974
imports were over sixty percent. The American increased demand for seafood led to a 1972
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Foreign fishing off American waters has increased significantly over
the past thirty years,28 due, in part, to the different character of
United States and foreign fishing efforts. Foreign fishing nations,
like Japan, possess large factory fleets that are frequently subsi-
dized and carry the latest technological equipment to permit exten-
sive distant-water fishing. In contrast, the United States'
commercial fishing industry consists primarily of small-unit enter-
prises, individually owned and operated close to home waters.
29
The enactment of the FCMA has far-reaching implications for
Japan. In 1975 the total catch made by Japanese distant-water
fisheries within the United States' 200-mile zone was approximately
1.4 million metric tons.3" The FCMA will reduce the Japanese
deficit of 1.3 billion dollars in fish and fisheries products payments - up 318 percent since
1960. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 32, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 604, 605.
In 1975 it was estimated that if domestic production replaced imports of foreign fisheries
products the United States economy would increase approximately three billion with an in-
crease of 200,000 man-years in employment. Hearings on S. 961 Before the Subcommittee on
Oceans and International Environment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1975) (statement of Senator Ted Stevens) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].
28. Id.
29. The United States commercial fishing industry was described in 1975 as follows:
The U.S. commercial fishing industry consists of approximately 150,000 fishermen,
1,800 processors, 1,200 wholesalers, and 2,000 importers/exporters, plus frozen and
canned food distributors and chain store, restaurant, and institutional buyers.
There are also approximately 85,000 people employed in processing and wholesal-
in* fish products.
It is largely although not entirely composed of many small enterprises spread along
the coastal States and throughout much of the interior of the country. An estimated
80 percent of the fishing craft in the United States is individually owned and 84
percent is under 5 tons. Small-unit operation also is characteristic of the processing
industry. Only a few large companies exist. About 42 percent of the plants have
sales of less than $100,000. Only 17 percent have sales of over $1 million and only
2.7 percent (43 plants) have sales of over $10 million. The few companies that may
be considered giants in the fish industry are quite small when compared to large
companies in other areas of food processing.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 30-31, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
603.
30. Yonezawa & Suda, Effects of Extended Jurisdiction on Japanese. Fisheries, in
EXTENDED FISHERY JURISDICTION: PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS 1977, 172 (K. Jurgensen &
A. Lovington eds. 1978) (Proceedings of the North Carolina Governor's Conference on Fish-
ery Management under Extended Jurisdiction).
Japan is not the only nation that has engaged in extensive fishing within 200 miles of Ameri-
can shores which is illustrated by the following table.
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catch and United States fees imposed on foreign vessels operating
within the zone will add to the costs of Japanese fisherman working
American fishing grounds.3 Japan's dietary habits, economy and
domestic and foreign politics could be altered by the FCMA.
This paper will examine the FCMA and the implications of
the Act for Japan. The reader will be introduced to: (1) the devel-
opment of ocean law; (2) the evolution and significance of the ex-
clusive economic zone concept; (3) the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976; and (4) the implications of the FCMA
for Japan.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF OCEAN LAW
A. Early Views
Throughout history the oceans have played a major role in in-
ternational affairs. 32 Nations have depended on the seas for their











U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Feb. 28, 1977, at 69.
31. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b) (10) (West Supp. 1980).
It was estimated that the 1.4-1.5 million tons of fish caught by the Japanese off the United
States coasts every year may be reduced by thirty to forty percent after the enactment of the
FCMA. Additionally, United States fees levied on foreign fishing could add twelve million
dollars a year to the costs of Japanese fishermen working in the American zone. U.S. NEWS
AND WORLD REPORT, Feb. 28, 1977, at 70. Currently, United States fees on foreign fishing
and fish processing in the United States FCZ are as follows: $1.00 per gross registered ton
(GRT) for catchers; $0.50 per GRT (up to $2,500) for processors; $200 per vessel for non-
retention on fishing vesels (Japanese tuna long-liners); and 3.5% poundage fee on ex-vessel
value of the catch. This system produced about $18.5 million in fees from foreign operations
in 1979. However, approximately $14 million of the fees may be refunded, due to the failure
of foreign fishermen to harvest their full allocations. AMERICAN FISHERIES PROMOTION ACT
REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 96-1138, Part 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1980) (Dissenting Views of
Congressman Paul N. M'Closkey, Jr.) (hereinafter cited as AMERICAN FISHERIES REPORT].
For a discussion of fees imposed on foreign fishing by the FCMA see generally Anderson &
Wilson, Economic Dimensions of Fees andAccess Control Under the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 701 (1977); Gaither & Strand, supra note 13.
32. See generally INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF OCEAN SPACE (R.
Wirsing ed. 1974); P. RAO, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF OCEAN RESOURCES (1975); and Huisken,
Naval Forces, reprinted m I OCEAN YEARBOOK 412 (M. Borgese & N. Ginsburg eds. 1978).
1981
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economies, for political power, and for military effectiveness. 33
With this dependence laws were formed to regulate the use of the
oceans.34 Roman law developed the theory that the sea is common
to all and that animalsferae naturae, including fish, belonged to no
one until caught. This Roman concept is illustrated in Ovid's ad-
monition "that the world of water was free to all, that Nature made
neither the sun nor air nor water private property but rather made
them public gifts, belonging to human society as a whole.
35
The first global threat to the Roman concept that the sea is
common to all was asserted by Spain and Portugal in the sixteenth
century. These two powers divided the vast oceans between them
from authority granted by Papal Edict. Spain's claim included the
exclusive right of navigation in the western Atlantic, in the Gulf of
Mexico and in the Pacific. Equivalent claims were granted to Por-
tugal in the Atlantic south of Morocco and in the Indian Ocean.
The Edict restricted commerce with other nations, especially with
the emerging markets in the New World and the East Indies.
36
There were few protests against the exclusive maritime dominion
enjoyed by Spain and Portugal.37
33. The United States Department of Defense opposed the FCMA because it feared
that any extension of coastal State jurisdiction would eventually infringe on the freedom of
navigation, thereby restricting the mobility of the Navy's nuclear submarines and the effec-
tiveness of the entire American nuclear deterrence strategy. Senate Hearings, supra note 27
at 84-85 (statement of Hon. Gerry E. Studds). United States dependence on imported energy
and mineral supplies will enhance the United States Navy's role as guardian of the world's
maritime trade routes. The Navy has advocated an unlimited expansion program to meet
the challenge of likely resource wars. A proposed Fifth Fleet in the Indian Ocean to protect
Persian Gulf oil supplies is currently being discussed. Klare, Resource Wars, 262 HARPER'S
20-23 (Jan. 1981); see also Richardson, Power Mobility and the Law of the Sea, 58 FOR. AFF.
902 (1980).
34. The Roman Empire probably first codified the concept of free ocean use in the sixth
century in the Code of Justinian. Fenn, Justinian and the Freedom ofthe Sea, 19 AM. J. INT'L
L. 716, 716-20 (1925).
The Romans, however, were not great seafarers and their lawyers, who had so much
influence on the western legal system, were not to interested in maritime law. When the
Roman Empire was confronted by strong external enemies they came not from some distant
land transported to the boundaries of Rome by the sea, but came from the interior of the
continent. The vast barbaric races that descended to destroy the glories of Rome had no
acquaintance with the sea or with the legal order that worked the empire. Thus, for centuries
the sea was to remain an area of "no-law," by general juridical consent. D. JOHNSTON, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 158-59 (1965). For an interesting discussion about
fishermen in ancient civilization see Kruezer, The Cradle of Sea Fisheries, reprinted in I
OCEAN YEARBOOK 102 (M. Borgere and N. Ginsburg eds. 1978).
35. E. JONES, LAW OF THE SEA: OCEANIC RESOURCES 6 (1972).
36. Id. at 7-8.
37. Id. at 7. Spain and Portugal enforced the exclusive rights conferred upon them by
the Pope with harsh sanctions, the death penalty or confiscation of goods. Id. at 8.
Vol. I11
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During this period there were basically two important uses of
the oceans: surface navigation, including commercial and military
uses, and fishing.3 8 Few nations possessed ocean-going vessels and
fleets were usually small.39 Thus, sixteenth century authors who
considered the question of appropriation of the seas generally ac-
cepted the theory that the seas were capable of appropriation and
that they were under the sovereignty of some nation.
B. The Grotius-Selden Debate- Freedom of the Seas
or State Ownership
Extensive worldwide exploration in the sixteenth century and
the colonial settlements multiplied the number of ocean users.
More importantly, these developments focused attention on the
need to resolve two conflicting philosophies of ocean use; national
ownership of the oceans, implicit in Spanish and Portuguese
claims, and freedom of the seas which was vital to the great trading
companies such as The Dutch East Indian Company.10
During the seventeenth century the Dutch extended their mar-
itime interest into the East Indies and thereby challenged the Papal
Edict which had reserved this area for the Portuguese. Controver-
sies ensued and The Dutch East Indian Company solicited the emi-
nent Dutch scholar and jurist, Hugo Grotius, to prepare a defense
of the trading policy with the East. His defense began with the
publication of Mare Liberum, or free sea,4 in 1609. The treatise
advocated not only the right of the Dutch, or any other nation, to
participate actively in the East Indian trade, but also articulated a
competing concept of ocean use: "[tihat all nations should have
free and equal access to the seas and its resources. ' '42
Grotius based his argument upon three interrelated assump-
tions: (1) that nations cannot occupy or enforce claims of owner-
ship to whole oceans; (2) that the resources of the oceans are
38. Newton, Seabed Resources: the Problems of Adolescence, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 551
(1971).
39. Id.
40. Swing, Who Will Own the Oceans?, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 527 (1976).
41. Jones, supra note 35, at 8-9. Gold, The Rise of the Coastal State in the Law of the
Sea, reprinted in MARINE POLICY AND THE COASTAL COMMUNITY 13, 17 (D. Johnston ed.
1976).
Mare Liberum. "The sea free. The title of a work written by Grotius against the Portu-
guese claim to an exclusive trade to the Indies, through the South Atlantic and Indian
Oceans; showing that the sea was not capable of private dominion." BLACK'S LAW DICTION-
ARY 119 (4th ed. 1968).
42. Christy, Marine Resources and the Freedom of the Seas, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 424,
425 (1968).
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inexhaustible; and (3) that a specific use of the oceans does not im-
pair other uses.43 These assumptions were based on Grotius' view
of the seas "[a]s incapable of being seized as the air (and therefore),
cannot have been attached to the possessions of any particular na-
tion.""
As part of his thesis, Grotius asserted that all property is based
upon occupation; and that "[tihings which cannot be seized nor be
subject to enclosure may not become property: they are common to
all, and their usage pertains to the entire human race rather than to
a particular people."45 By maintaining that "every nation is free to
travel to every other nation and to engage in trade with it,"46 Gro-
tius incorporated the Roman concept that the sea is common to all.
It is interesting to note that the major arguments against Gro-
tius did not come from Spain or Portugal, but from England. In
1580 Queen Elizabeth declared that England would adopt the prin-
ciple of freedom of the seas as a rule of the Law of Nations. 7 By
the seventeenth century England had become a major maritime
power with distant colonial possessions and freedom of the seas
was no longer an advantageous doctrine. As a result, England re-
versed its position and claimed dominion over the seas surrounding
her coasts.
4 8
English claims were supported by the erudite British scholar
John Selden. In 1635 Selden articulated his support of the English
position in his book Mare Clausum, or closed sea.49 Selden as-
serted that oceans were capable of appropriation and that in several
instances they have been appropriated. He noted that Grotius
43. A. KOERS, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF MARINE FISHERIES 17 (1973).
44. Swing, supra note 40, at 528.
45. Jones, supra note 35, at 9.
Roman law characterized things that belonged to no one as "res nullius," and things
that belonged to everyone as "res communis" including air, running water, and the sea.
These things were considered incapable of private ownership and could be enjoyed by all.
Things which were deemed to be "res nullius" included wild animals and abandoned prop-
erty, and "[wiere open to acquisition under a rule of capture by the first person to properly
claim them and reduce them to physical possession." Collins, Mineral Exploitation of the
Seabed- Problems, Progress, and.41ternatives, 12 NAT. RESOURCES L. 599, 615 (1979). For a
discussion on natural resource property rights see Symposium on Natural Resource Properly
Rights, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 639 (1975).
46. Jones, supra note 35, at 10.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Gold, supra note 41, at 17.
Mare Clausum. "The sea closed; that is not open or free. The title of Selden's great work,
intended as an answer to the Mare Liberum of Grotius; in which he undertakes to prove the
sea to be capable of private dominion." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (4th ed. 1968).
Vol. I I
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made an exception for bays, inlets and coastal waters, for these
were, according to Grotius, traditionally part of the mainland. Sel-
den reasoned that if such open waters as bays and inlets could be
appropriated, then the high seas could also be subject to national
jurisdiction by publishing maps which detailed enclosures by lati-
tude and longitude.5"
The real issue in the Grotius-Selden debate was not the feasi-
bility of nations appropriating the oceans, but the paying of tariffs
to a nation for navigational use of the high seas. Grotius main-
tained that ships should not have to pay for a license to navigate
and trade with a distant nation. He feared the levying of fees by
different countries along the commercial route. Selden, however,
concluded that the imposition of navigational license fees would
benefit not only the trade between England and her colonies, but
also trade through the Straits of Gibraltar.
51
Although the Grotius-Selden debate continued into the late
eighteenth century, the Grotian view ultimately prevailed. 2 The
adoption of the Grotian view did not mean that coastal States were
without any control over adjacent waters. The doctrine of freedom
of the seas prohibited the establishment of national sovereignty
over the high seas, but, from its inception in the seventeenth cen-
tury, the doctrine was not applied to coastal waters. Because of the
defense needs of coastal States, a three-mile53 territorial sea was
generally recognized in which the coastal State was sovereign, sub-
ject only to a right of innocent passage for foreign vessels. The
oceans of the globe have therefore been traditionally divided into
two basic components: the high seas, which are free for the use of
all nations, and the territorial seas, over which coastal States exer-
cise jurisdiction.
50. J. HARGROVE, WHO PROTECTS THE OCEAN? 20 (1975).
51. Id. at 21.
52. The doctrine advocating freedom of the seas was articulated in 1509 by the Spanish
jurist de Vitoria. However, it was Grotius who established the principle on a firm legal basis.
Jones, supra note 35, at 11-12.
53. There is a difference of opinion over the origin of the three-mile territorial sea.
Some authors maintain that the three-mile territorial sea was established because that was
the distance an eighteenth-century cannon could reach. Swing, supra note 40, at 528. Other
authors claim that the three-mile territorial sea was established when Galiani the Italian
jurist suggested that the marine league, a standard measure, be taken as the breadth of the
territorial sea. These authors assert that three nautical miles was well in excess of the range
of any eighteenth century cannon. Alexander & Hodgson, The Impact of the 200-Mile Eco-
nomic Zone on the Law fthe Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 569 (1975). For further discussion
on the origin and development of the three-mile limit see Jones, supra note 35, at 56-60.
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C. The 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences
In an effort to codify and develop the Law of the Sea, the
United Nations International Law Commission prepared four draft
conventions concerning specific uses of the territorial sea, the high
seas, the continental shelf and fisheries conservation. These formed
the basis for the four conventions adopted at the 1958 and 1960
Geneva Law of the Sea Conference,54 and have been ratified by
enough governments so that they have the force of international
law.
55
The conventions partition the oceans into five jurisdictional
zones.5 6 Beginning with the zone nearest to the coast, the State ex-
ercises complete sovereignty over its internal waters, including
bays, inlets and other adjacent waters. Seaward of the internal wa-
ters is the territorial sea,57 the second jurisdictional zone, over
which the State's sovereignty is limited only by the right of inno-
cent passage by foreign vessels.58 Beyond the territorial sea is the
contiguous zone. Within this third zone the State may exercise the
necessary control over foreign vessels to prevent and punish viola-
tions of their customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations.59
The fourth jurisdictional zone is the continental shelf, the shallow
platform extending out from the land for varying distances beneath
the sea. 60 Over its continental shelf, the coastal State exercises ex-
54. The 1958 conventions of the United Nations codified the prevailing law of the sea
including the Convention on the High Seas April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, 15
U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of
the Living Resources of the High Seas, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285; Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S.
5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
55. The Fishing Convention has failed to establish an internationally accepted fishing
policy because the negotiators at the Geneva Conference of 1958 followed Grotius' doctrine
on freedom of the seas, but the participants in the present Law of the Sea Conference are
seeking agreement on the allocation and management of ocean resources. Mirvahabi, Signf-
cant Fishery Management Issues in the Law of the Sea Conference.- Illusions and Realities, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 493, 506 (1978).
56. Alexander, National Jurisdiction and the Use ofthe Sea, 8 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373,
375-76 (1968).
57. There is no agreement among nations on a standard breadth for the territorial sea,
which varies from 3 to 200 miles.
58. Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone defines
innocent passage as: "Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order or security of the coastal State." April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205.
59. A State may exercise control over these infringements only if they are committed
within the coastal State's territory or territorial sea.
60. Article 1 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf defines the Continental Shelf
Vol. I11
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clusive rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting its natural
resources.6 The fifth and outermost jurisdictional zone is the high
seas, which is open to all nations. Within this zone countries are
guaranteed the four freedoms of the seas: freedom of navigation;
freedom of fishing; freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
and freedom to fly over the high seas.
62
D. The Consequences of Technology
Post World War II technical achievements have provided na-
tions with the technical capacity to employ the oceans for an in-
creasing variety of uses.63  Modem fishing technology now
threatens the ancient practice of unrestricted ocean fishing. These
technological advances - more powerful ships, larger nets, 64 fish
detection by radar and earth satellites, and high seas processing
have combined with the expansion of fishing nations and long-dis-
tance fishing fleets to make ocean fishing a significant international
activity. With these rapid changes fish stocks have been exploited,
resulting in an economic scarcity of marketable fish. While there
are more than 20,000 species of marine fish in the oceans, 65 com-
mercial demand is mainly for cod, haddock, tuna, halibut, lobster,
as "(a) the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the
area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to where the depth
of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas;
(b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands."
April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.1.A.S. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
61. Article 2 of the convention on the Continental Shelf describes the coastal State's
right to exploit continental shelf resources as follows:
1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the
purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph I of this article are exclusive in the sense
that if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or exploit its
natural resources, no one may undertake these activities, or make a claim to the
continental shelf, without the express consent of the coastal State.
3. The rights of the coastal State over the continental shelf do not depend on
occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.
4. The natural resources referred to in these articles consist of the mineral and
other non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil together with living orga-
nisms belonging to sedentary species that is to say, organisms which, at the
harvestable state, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to
move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the subsoil.
April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
62. States are required to exercise these and other freedoms recognized by the general
principles of international law with reasonable regard for the interests of other States. April
29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.
63. Hollick, The Roots of U.S. Fisheries Policy, 5 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 61 (1978).
64. The replacement of cotton with nylon fishing nets has increased the durability of
fishing equipment. 1d.
65. Clingan, A Second Look at United States Fisheries Management, 9 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 432, 433 (1972).
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salmon and a few other species.66
In addition, the supply of fish is also restricted by natural con-
ditions of the sea. Living and non-living resources are unevenly
divided throughout the world. As deserts exist on land where few
plants or animals of economic value can be sustained, so too, do the
oceans contain areas of little or no fishing life. 67 Except for highly
migratory (tuna) or anadromous species (salmon), the living re-
sources of the sea tend to be concentrated in the shallow shelf or
bank areas of the world or where plankton exists to sustain living
marine resources.68 Within these shallow waters the most fertile
grounds for fishing are found in the middle-latitudes: the Cana-
dian, the Icelandic, and the North Sea Banks.
The supply of fish is further limited by over-exploitation, since
there is a maximum annual catch that can be maintained over
time. 69 If larger amounts of fish are taken, fewer fish will be avail-
able in subsequent seasons. However, present reductions in the
harvest of fish may lead to higher future annual yields.
The outlook is not encouraging. As demand increases there is
increased fishing in those regions where the high valued species oc-
cur, reducing both the stocks and the total seasonal catches. Hence,
one of the fundamental freedoms of the high seas, fishing, is no
longer a viable principle for world management of the oceans. In
Grotius' time the relatively simple fishing techniques led to the rea-
sonable conclusion that the living resources of the sea were inex-
haustible, and therefore represented common property to be
appropriated at will. This assumption can no longer be main-
tained.7 °
Man's increased capacity to explore and exploit the oceans has
also produced rising expectations among the world's developing
nations. Meaningful third world participation in the development
66. Some changes in commercial demand occur in response to changes in taste prefer-
ences and to changes in the ability to disguise the source of the protein. However, these
changes are not likely to decrease the demand for the well-known species of fish. Christy,
supra note 42, at 426.
67. Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 53, at 576.
68. Id. The exceptionally fertile waters off the coast of Peru produce 300 or more
pounds of protein per acre per year. Christy, supra note 42, at 426.
69. While the total potential production of marine fisheries is estimated to range from
fifty-five million to two billion metric tons, the latter figure represents the theoretical total
fishery production available. The majority of commentators estimate the production of
marine resources at less than 100 million metric tons annually. Eisenbud, supra note 19, at
20; see also supra note 22.
70. Jacobson, Bridging the Gap to International Fisheries Agreement: A Guidefor Unilat-
eralAction, 9 SAN DIEOo L. REv. 454, 458 (1975).
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of ocean policy as a means of narrowing the economic gap between
themselves and the developed world 7 has occurred through the
United Nations. In 1967 Ambassador Pardo of Malta addressed
the U.N. General Assembly and declared that the wealth to be
found in or on the seabed in ocean areas beyond national jurisdic-
tion should constitute the "common heritage of mankind. ' 72 To
71. This economic gap is illustrated by the fact that in 1973, the developed world, with
less than twenty percent of the world's population, enjoyed a combined gross national prod-
uct of $3.2 trillion dollars, some sixty-six percent of the world's product. Thus, the Third
World asserts that this high standard of living in the industralized world is attained by the
exploitation of the resources of the developing countries. Further, developing States argue
that since the international system economically and politically supports the interests of the
developed nations, a new international economic order must be established to narrow the
gap between themselves and the rich nations. Juda, supra note 16, at 224.
Developed nations justify their wealth as resulting from their skill, organization and
technology operating in competitive world markets and not from the exploitation of the peo-
ples and resources of developing countries. Developed States maintain that, with some
assistance and similar efforts, developing nations should be able to narrow the existing eco-
nomic gap between developed and developing countries without the dislocation caused by
the implementation of a new international economic order. Bilder, International Law and
Natural Resources Policy, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 450, 466-67 (1980). For a discussion on
international development see generally Goldie, Rich and Poor Countries and the Limits of
Ideology - An Introduction to the Day's Proceedings, I SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 92
(1972); Haq, The Problem of Global Economic Inequity: Legal Structures and Some Thoughts
on the Next 40 Years, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 507 (1979); Haq, From Charity to Obliga-
tion: A Third World Perspective on Concessional Resource Transfers, 14 TEX. INT'L L. J. 389
(1979).
72. The basic elements of the common-heritage concept, as proposed by the government
of Malta, were as follows: (a) the area under the common-heritage regime may not be appro-
priated (it may be used but not owned); (b) all rights to resources in the common-heritage
area are vested in mankind as a whole acting through an international organization; (c) the
common-heritage area and its resources are managed through an international organization
in which all States have the right to participate; (d) benefits, both financial and deriving from
participation in management and exchange and transfer of technologies, are shared; (e) the
common-heritage area may be used only for peaceful purposes; and (f) the common-heritage
area must be transmitted environmentally unimpaired to future generations. Pardo, The
Evolving Law of the Sea: A Critique of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (1977), re-
printed in I OCEAN YEARBOOK 9 (M. Borgese & N. Ginsburg ed. 1978).
Ambassador Pardo's statement was not the first one to refer to mankind in an interna-
tional document. Among prior statements is the United Nations Charter, which character-
izes wars as a "scourage of mankind"; the Antarctic Treaty, which refers to the "interests of
science and mankind"; the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which refers
to "the devastation that would be visted upon all mankind by a nuclear war"; and the United
Nations General Assembly recognized the "common interest of mankind as a whole" in
furthering the peaceful uses of outer space. Gorove, The Concept of 'Common Heritage of
Mankind' 4 Political Moral or Legal Innovation?, 9 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 390, 391 (1972).
See also Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement Gov-
erning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14 INT'L LAW. 429
(1980).
Ambassador Pardo's remarks reflected the views of developing countries who were con-
cerned that newly developed deep sea technology by a few advanced industralized nations,
would permit mining of valuable manganese nodules scattered over the deep seabed. These
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provide for a more equitable distribution of wealth resulting from
seabed exploitation, Ambassador Pardo proposed the creation of an
international agency with authority to lease seabed areas beyond
national jurisdiction. The revenue to be derived from the leasing
program would be made available for international development. 7
On December 17, 1970, the U.N. General Assembly approved a
resolution which stated that the seabed and subsoil beyond the lim-
its of national jurisdiction, together with their resources, were to be
developed for the common benefit of mankind.74
II. THE EVOLUTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
EXCLJSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE
Historically, the nations of the world have usually complied
with the concept of freedom of the seas and the principle of open
fishing. Today, this doctrine is seriously questioned with the grow-
ing number of coastal States asserting jurisdiction over an exclusive
economic zone extending 200 miles from their coasts.75
nodules are composed of manganese, iron, nickel, copper, colbalt and various other valuable
minerals needed by industralized nations. Bilder, supra note 71, at 462. For a discussion on
deep seabed resources see J. BARKENBUS, note 73 infra; Collins, supra note 45; and Sympo-
sium, Mining the Deep Seabed- 4 Range o/Perspectives, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 167
(1978-79).
73. J. BARKENBUS, DEEP SEABED RESOURCES 32-33 (1979). Developing nations feel
that it would be unfair for a few industralized nations currently capable of mining seabed
resources to obtain the benefits of this "common heritage." In their view, the only just solu-
tion is to give seabed resources to the developing world who represent the mass of the world's
population and are in the greatest need of the resource. To developed States, however, it
would be unjust for their private companies which have invested capital, time and effort in
seabed mining technology, to have the rewards go to nations who have invested little or
nothing. Bilder, supra note 71, at 470. See also Tee, Deep Seabed Mining and Developing
Countries, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 213 (1978-79); and Young, Indurement/or Explo-
ration by Companies, 6 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 199 (1978-79); and Newlin, An Alterna-
tive Legal Mechanismfor Deep Sea Mining, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 257 (1980) and Arrow, The
Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation of Deep Seabed Mineral Resources by the
United States, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 337 (1980).
74. R. DupuY, THE LAW OF THE SEA 24 (1974).
75. Well before the Papal Edict in the sixteenth century, nations have asserted national
sovereignty over adjacent waters since at least the thirteenth century.
Venice, eminent in commercial activities, affluence, and maritime power, assumed sov-
ereignty over the entire Adriatic Sea before the conclusion of the thirteenth century. Trib-
utes were levied on ships to navigate the Adriatic or the passage of ships was prohibited.
Adjacent cities and States were compelled to agree to the demands of Venice, which were
ultimately recognized by other European powers and by the Pope. Jones, supra note 35, at 6.
The Venetian' claim to the Adriatic went unchallenged by the Christian States of Europe so
long as her maritime supremacy served as a bulwark against the possible encroachment of
the Muslim Turkish Empire in Europe. Johnston, supra note 34, at 164.
Similar claims were also made by other Mediterranean States, including Genoa in the
Liguarian Sea and by the Tuscans and Pisans in the Tyrrhenian Sea. However, the Venetian
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The current movement toward unilateral control over ocean
resources can be traced to President Truman's proclamation re-
garding the Policy of the United States with respect to Coastal
Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas.76 The Truman Procla-
mation, issued in 1945, declared that the government of the United
States had the authority to establish conservation zones in the high
seas contiguous to the coast of the United States. The proclamation
also asserted the United States' power to regulate and control fish-
ing activities within these zones."
Although the proclamation did not establish any conservation
zones,7 8 it provided a precedent for several Latin American nations
concerning their rights in waters contiguous to their coasts. On
June 23, 1947 Chile became the first country to claim a 200-mile
zone. 79 Shortly thereafter, Peru adopted a 200-mile zone to protect
claim exceeded all others of its day. It went so far as to claim actual ownership, not merely
exclusive jurisdiction, to the whole of the Gulf and Sea of the Adriatic as well as the islands
contained therein. Id.
76. The motivating purpose behind President Truman's proclamation was conservation
and arose out of the incursion of Japanese fishermen into the Alaska Bristol Bay red salmon
fishery. HousE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD.
NEWS 597. For a discussion on the Truman Proclamation see generally Hollick, U.S Oceans
Policy.- The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 23 (1976).
77. Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil
and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, reprinted in 59
Stat. 884, and 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 485 (1945). President Truman explained the Proclama-
tion in the following manner:
In view of the pressing need for conservation and protection of fisheries resources,
the Government of the United States of America regards it as proper to establish
conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coast of the
United States wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may be devel-
oped and maintained on a substantial scale . . . and all fishing activities in such
zones shall be subject to regulation and control. . .. The right of any State to estab-
lish conservation zones off its shores . . . is conceded. . . The character as high
seas of areas where such conservation zones are established and the right to their
free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus affected ...
HousE REPORT, supra note 22, at 25, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS
597.
78. The Truman fisheries proclamation was never actually implemented into law and,
according to the Digest of International Law, the proclamation per se asserts no claim to
exclusive fisheries jurisdiction over high seas fishing areas off the coast of the United States.
Instead, the purpose of the fisheries proclamation was to establish, as United States policy,
that where fishing activities were developed or maintained jointly by the United States and
other nations, conservation zones would be established, but only pursuant to agreement be-
tween the United States and such other nations. The effect of the proclamation has caused
attempts by the State Department to negotiate international agreements to protect certain
species of fish, especially the salmon which were threatened by the Japanese. Id.
79. The Chilean claim was motivated by domestic business interests who sought to pro-
tect their developing offshore whaling operations from encroachment by.post World War II
European whalers. During the. Second World War, European whaling operations in
Antarctic waters were discontinued. Isolated from European sources of fats and cooking oils
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the abundant fisheries off its shore; Ecuador followed with a similar
claim in 1951.80 The Santiago Declaration of 1952, issued by Chile,
Ecuador and Peru (CEP), was the first multilateral agreement
which established maritime zones of 200 miles. The Latin Ameri-
can States justified their claims by asserting that the unique inter-
ests of coastal States in the "partimonial sea" dictated their
establishment.8"
However, it was the nations of Africa, led by Kenya and
Tanzania, who created and popularized the terms "economic zone
of exclusive coastal state jurisdiction" or "exclusive economic
zone" to describe the area beyond the territorial sea claimed by
coastal States for their exclusive resource development.8 2 In its res-
olution of 1971, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) estab-
lished a national economic zone of 212 miles from the baseline in
the oceans and seas surrounding Africa.8 3 The exclusive economic
zone concept spread quickly, with more than one hundred States
supporting its adoption at the 1974 UNCLOS III meetings.
8 4
Newly independent countries have claimed 200-mile economic
zones for political and economic reasons. Politically, the 200-mile
zone claims were supported by newly independent States as a
means of challenging the rules of international law laid down by
colonial powers before their independence.85 In an effort to pro-
mote economic development newly independent States have
claimed control over offshore resources. Fisheries, for example, are
of great importance for the economy of countries like Peru and Ec-
uador. Fishing creates a much needed source of employment, gen-
erates foreign exchange and provides protein supplement for the
deficient local diets. 6 It has been estimated that approximately
and protected from competition with foreign vessels, a Chilean firm entered the whaling
business to supply these items. The conclusion of the war renewed European interest in
Antarctic whaling and prompted the Chilean claim to coastal waters to protect a growing
national industry. Hollick, The Origins o/200-Mile Offshore Zones, Notes and Comments, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 495-96 (1977).
80. Id. at 499.
81. Patrimonial is not synonymous with territorial, but protects an inherent right of the
coastal State based on geographical continuity and preexistent international claims.
Mirvahabi, Conservation and Management of Fisheries in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 J.
MAR. L. & CoM. 225, 229-30 (1978).
82. Pollard, The Exclusive Economic Zone -. The Elusive Consensus, 12 SAN DIEGO L.
lEv. 600, 606 (1975).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 607.
85. Mirvahabi, supra note 55, at 497.
86. Liston & Smith, Fishing and the Fishing Industry: An Account With Comments on
Overseas Technology Transfer, 2 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 285 (1974).
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sixty-four percent of the world's fisheries are off the coastal regions
of the developing world 87 and the Third World maintains that this
resource should be developed for their benefit.88 The establishment
of legal ownership to offshore resources is, however, only an initial
87. Shyam, The Emerging Fisheries Regime.- Implications for India, 8 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 35, 52 (1980).
88. The ongoing Law of the Sea Conference has special provisions to assist geographi-
cally disadvantaged (those with a limited coastline), land-locked, and developing States in
the allocation of ocean resources. The provisions are noteworthy because most of the land-
locked States (LLS) are also developing countries. Of the twenty-one developing LLS (there
are thirty LLS in the world), fifteen are among the twenty-five States designated by the
United Nations as the least developed countries. See U.N. Doc. E/AC.54/L. 72 (1975);
Kronfol, The Exclusive Economic Zone: .4 Critique of Contemporary Law of the Sea, 9 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 461, 473 (1977).
Articles 69 and 70 of The Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/WP.10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNT outlines the right of LLS and developing
coastal States to participate in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive eco-
nomic zone (EEZ) of adjoining coastal States "on an equitable basis":
Article 69. Right of land-locked States
I. Land-locked States shall have the right to participate in the exploitation of the
living resources of the exclusive economic zones of adjoining coastal States on an
equitable basis, taking into account the relevant economic and geograpical circum-
stances of all the States concerned. The terms and conditions of such participation
shall be determined by the States concerned through bilateral, subregional or re-
gional agreements. Developed land-locked States shall, however, be entitled to ex-
ercise their rights only within the exclusive economic zones of adjoining developed
coastal States.
2. This article is subject to the provisions of articles 61 and 62.
Article 70. Right of certain developing coastal States in a subregion or region
1. Developing coastal States which are situated in a subregion or region whose
geographical peculiarities make such States particularly dependent for the satisfac-
tion of the nutritional needs of their populations upon the exploitation of the living
resources in the exclusive economic zones of their neighbouring States and develop-
ing coastal States which can claim no exclusive economic zones of their own shall
have the right to participate, on an equitable basis, in the exploitation of living
resources in the exclusive economic zones of other States in a subregion or region.
2. The terms and conditions of such participation shall be determined by the
States concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements, taking into
account the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all the States
concerned, including the need to avoid effects detrimental to the fishing communi-
ties or to the fishing industries of the States in whose zones the right of participation
is exercised.
3. This article is subject to the provisions of articles 61 and 62.
Reprinted in Krueger & Nordquist, The Evolution of the 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone.-
State Practice in the Pacofc Basin, 19 VA. J. INT'L L. 321, 387-88 (1979).
Article 69 affords special treatment to developing LLS by restricting developed LLS to
the EEZ's of adjoining developed coastal States. For a discussion on the geographically
disadvantaged States in the Law of the Sea, see Alexander & Hodgson, The Role of the
Geographically Disadvantaged States in the Law ofthe Sea, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 58 (1976);
Phillips, The Economic Resource Zone - Progressfor the Developing Coastal States, II J.
MAR. L. & COM. 349 (1980). Developing LLS may not reap the benefit provided for by
Articles 69 and 70. ICNT Article 71 provides that "the provisions of articles 69 and 70 shall
not apply in the case of a coastal State whose economy is overwhelmingly dependent on the
exploitation of the living resources of its exclusive economic zone." Krueger & Nordquist,
supra note 88, at 388.
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step toward the development of the resource. Many developing na-
tions who support the exclusive economic zone are not presently
equipped to develop their maritime resources because they lack the
scientific information, capital, technical and managerial expertise
necessary to fully exploit offshore resources.89
The final definition of the economic zone which emerged from
the Law of the Sea Conference provided the coastal State with
soverign rights to all living and non-living resources within the 200-
mile exclusive economic zone.9" In addition, the coastal State has
authority regarding the protection of the marine environment, con-
89. India is a good example of a developing country that is not presently equipped to
fully exploit coastal resources. A 200-mile exclusive economic zone will provide India with
jurisdiction over maritime resources in approximately 587,600 square nautical miles of the
Indian Ocean, the least exploited of all the world's oceans. The potential fish catch from the
Indian Ocean has been estimated to be approximately fifteen million tons a year compared to
the 1976 harvest of about 3.3 million tons. India took forty-six percent of the total Indian
Ocean catch in 1976. However, Indian's catch per fisherman is among the lowest in the
world. About sixty percent of India's total marine catch comes from fishermen who operate
about five to ten miles from shores, using a variety of primitive fishing craft-catamarans,
dugout canoes, and plank-built boats. India illustrates the challenge facing developing
coastal States who need capital, managerial skill and coastal infrastructure to effectively de-
velop coastal resources. Shyam, supra note 87, at 36, 43.
While developing coastal nations lack the means to fully exploit offshore resources,
these States may still acquire an economic benefit in the form of rents from distant-water
fishing fleets for the privilege of fishing within the economic zone of developing nations.
Gaither & Strand, supra note 13, at 136.
For an interesting analysis of a fishing village in a developing country see Alexander,
The Modernization of Peasant Fisheries in Sri Lanka, reprinted in MARINE POLICY AND THE
COASTAL COMMUNITY 279 (D. Johnston ed. 1976).
90. Articles 55, 56 and 57 of the ICNT describe the exclusive economic zone, its
breadth, and the rights of the coastal State within the EEZ in the following manner:
Article 55. Specific legal regime of the exclusive economic zone.
The exclusive economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial
sea subject to the specific legal regime established in this Part, under which the
rights and jurisdictions of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other
States are governed by the relevant provisions of the present Convention.
Article 56. Rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive eco-
nomic zone
I. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving
and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the sea-
bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities
for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the produc-
tion of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdictions as provided for in the relevant provisions of the present Con-
vention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and struc-
tures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in the present Convention.
Article 57. Breadth of the exclusive economic zone
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servation, scientific research and the establishment and use of artifi-
cial islands, installations and structures.
9'
The proposals also impose several duties on the coastal State
to:92 (1) adopt conservation measures;93 (2) maintain maximum
sustainable yield through full utilization and elimination of over-
exploitation;94 (3) determine the allowable catch of the living re-
sources in its EEZ, and give other States access to the surplus of the
allowable catch if the coastal State does not have the capacity to
harvest such catch;95 and (4) in giving access to other States to its
The exclusive economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical
miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured.
ICNT, supra note 88, reprinted in Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 88, at 380.
Article 58 provides for the rights of other States, whether coastal or land-locked, in the
EEZ, and includes the freedoms of navigation and overflight, and the laying of submarine
cables and pipelines.
Id., reprinted in Krueger & Nordquist supra note 88, at 381.
91. Id. art. 56(1).
92. The duties of the coastal State within the EEZ are enumerated in Articles 61 and 62
of the ICNT which state:
Article 61. Conservation of the living resources
i. The coastal State shall determine the allowable catch of the living resources in
its exclusive economic zone.
2. The coastal State, taking into account the best scientific evidence available to it,
shall ensure through proper conservation and management measures that the main-
tenance of the living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by
overexploitation. As appropriate, the coastal State and relevent subregional, re-
gional and global organizations shall co-operate to this end.
3. Such measures shall also be designed to maintain or restore populations of har-
vested species at levels which can produce the maximum sustainable yield, as quali-
fied by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the economic needs
of coastal fishing communities and the special requirements of developing coun-
tries, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and
any generally recommended subregional, regional or global minimum stan-
dards....
Article 62. Utilization of the living resources
I. The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the liv-
ing resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61.
2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources of
the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to
harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or other arrange-
ments and pursuant to the terms, conditions and regulations referred to in para-
graph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the allowable catch.
3. In giving access to other States to its exclusive economic zone under this article,
the coastal State shall take into account all relevant factors, including inter alia, the
significance of the living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State
concerned and its other national interests, the provisions of articles 69 and 70, the
requirements of developing countries in the subregion or region in harvesting part
of the surplus and the need to minimize economic dislocation in States whose na-
tionals have habitually fished in the zone or which have made substantial efforts in
research and identification of stocks.
Id., reprinted in Krueger and Nordquist, supra note 88, at 382-84.
93. Id. art. 61.
94. Id.
95. Id. art. 62(2).
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EEZ, the coastal State shall take into account the significance of the
living resources of the area to the economy of the coastal State con-
cerned,96 the requirement of developing countries in the subregion
or region in harvesting part of the surplus and "the need to mini-
mize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitual-
ly fished in the zone"9 7 or which have made substantial efforts in
research and identification of stocks.9a
The 200-mile limit is an arbitrary figure that has no scientific
basis and is not related to any geographical or geological data.
The reason why the 200-mile figure was chosen, instead of 100 or
150 or 300, is essentially political.a9
For various reasons, States have claimed different forms of
sovereignty in zones up to 200 miles from their shores. According
to the development of international law, where norms of acceptable
conduct are not legislated, but are established by the practice of
nations, 100 they may become part of customary international law. '0'
96. See note 88 supra for the provisions of Articles 69 and 70.
97. This provision is designed to protect the interests of distant-water fishing nations,
like Japan, who have historically fished in waters adjacent to foreign countries.
98. ICNT, supra note 88, at art. 62(3).
99. Chile, the first country to claim a 200-mile offshore zone, thought that a 200-mile
claim was necessary to be consistent with the security zone adopted in the 1939 Declaration
of Panama. The declaration, a product of United States initiative, proclaimed a neutrality
zone of about 300 miles around the Western Hemisphere, except Canada, where hostilities
between the European belligerents were prohibited as long as the American republics re-
mained neutral. Chile, whose whaling interests needed protection only to about fifty miles,
felt it was necessary to base their unilateral claim to expanded offshore jurisdiction on inter-
national precedent and chose the Declaration of Panama to justify the new claim. Thus, 200-
mile claims to offshore maritime zones find their origin in the concerns of a small whaling
industry to protect their exclusive access to a marine resource and in the mistaken interpreta-
tion of a 1939 neutrality declaration.
Scientific research has established that the most abundant fishing grounds of the ocean
are located within eighty miles from shore. Despite this fact, there are relevant arguments to
support the 200-mile figure for an exclusive economic zone. First, EEZ's were established for
the exploitation of both living and non-living resources of the ocean. Second, the majority of
nations are coastal States and therefore can benefit from EEZ's. Third, the zone usually
includes the Continental Shelf of the coastal State. Finally, the EEZ may protect adjacent
coastal fishery resources from foreign fishing fleets.
There are, however, counter-arguments to the 200-mile exclusive fishery zone. First, the
200-mile zone does not cover highly migratory fish species. Second, the high cost of effective
enforcement of fisheries jurisdiction. Finally, the economic gain from an eighty-mile
abundant fishing zone may be more desirable than the political gains from a 200-mile fishing
zone. Mirvahabi, supra note 55, at 499.
100. N. LEECH, C. OLIVER, & J. SWEENEY, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 25
(1973).
101. One commentator has stated: "[Tihere is an overwhelming consensus at the [U.N.
Law of the Sea] conference favoring recognition of the right of coastal states to exercise
resource jurisdiction in an 'exclusive economic zone' extending at least 200 miles from their
Vol. I I
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In the past most nations limited their claims of offshore juris-
diction to twelve miles or less. '1 2 The areas affected by such claims
were the narrow water bodies, particularly straits.l°3 However, the
adoption of a 200-mile offshore zone greatly increases the areas af-
fected.
As a consequence of such extensive jurisdictional claims and
of geographical positioning, the 200-mile zone encloses a significant
portion of the global ocean, particularly the world's enclosed and
semi-enclosed seas. Seas such as the Baltic, North, Red, Java, Car-
ibbean, Mediterranean, Norwegian, Ockhotask, and Arabian will
be under the jurisdiction of nearby coastal States. Furthermore,
other semi-enclosed water bodies like the Gulf of Mexico, the Per-
sian Gulf and the Bay of Bengal 1° would be almost completely
enclosed by jurisdictional claims. If all the coastal States claimed
coasts. Relying on this consensus, the United States, Canada, Japan, the Soviet Union, and
other nations including those of the European Economic Community, have established 200-
mile fishery limits." Bilder, supra note 71, at 454. On July I1, 1974, in a major speech by
Ambassador John R. Stevenson, Special Representative of the President and United States
Representative to the Law of the Sea Conference, Mr. Stevenson noted the international
consensus of an exclusive economic zone as part of a final Law of the Sea Agreement. Mr.
Stevenson stated:
In the course of listening to and reading the statements made during the last 2
weeks, I have been struck by the very large measure of agreement on the general
outlines of an overall settlement. Most delegations that have spoken have endorsed
or indicated a willingness to accept, under certain conditions and as part of a pack-
age settlement, a maximum limit of 12 miles for the territorial sea and of 200 miles
for an economic zone, and an international regime for the deep sea bed in the area
beyond national jurisdiction.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 27, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS
600.
102. Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 53, at 572.
103. Id.
104. Id.
"The following Table reflects the total areal effects of the 200-mile claims. The presence
of semi-enclosed seas and scattered islands in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans account for the
proportionately greater percentage under national jurisdictions in contrast with the more
open Indian Ocean."
Allocation of Areas in Square Nautical Miles to Coastal States
Area (and Per Cent of Total) Closed
Ocean Total Area Off by the 200-Mile Limit
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200-mile zones, 105 million square nautical miles or thirty-six per-
cent of the earth's ocean surface would be enclosed.0 5 Within this
area, fishermen harvest ninety-four percent of the world's fish
catch;1° 6 eighty-seven percent of the globe's known oil and gas de-
posits are located;' 07 eighty percent of marine scientific research oc-
curs; 1 8 and most shipping takes place.1°9
Coastal States do have a legitimate interest in the exploitation
105. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 88, at 321.
The allocations to coastal States of their national zones of jurisdiction will
clearly relate to (1) the size of the State, in particular, the length of its coastline; (2)
the number and distribution of islands under its sovereignty; (3) its location in the
open ocean, in contrast to an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea; and (4) the nature of
the ultimate boundary delimitation with adjacent or opposite States.
Until all baselines are delimited and all boundaries agreed upon by adjacent
and/or opposite States, it is impossible to determine the area of national jurisdic-
tion for each coastal country. However, assuming an equidistant boundary and a
normal baseline, it appears that the largest economic zones will belong to the fol-
lowing States:
States with the Largest Economic Zones
Area (approximate) in

















These fifteen coastal States would receive among them approximately forty-two
percent of the world's 200-mile economic zone area.
Significantly, these States are among the world's largest, or possess a large number
of islands scattered over the oceans.
Alexander & Hodgson, supra note 53, at 574-75.
106. Alexander, supra note 20, at 68.
107. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 88, at 321. In 1974 approximately seventeen per-
cent of the world's oil came from off-shore wells, and it is estimated that by 1980 one-third of
the world's oil will come from offshore production. Alexander, supra note 20, at 71.
108. Kissinger, The Law of the Sea. A Test of International Cooperation, 74 DEP'T OF
STATE BULL. 533, 537 (April 26, 1976).
109. Kronfol, supra note 88, at 463.
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and management of fisheries and mineral resources off their coasts.
The United States, as a coastal State shares this interest, and to
effectuate it, Congress passed and President Ford signed the
FCMA.
III. THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT
ACT OF 1976
4. General Provisions
Congress enacted the FCMA to protect and conserve valuable
and necessary national fishery resources as well as to restore the
United States position among the major fishing nations."' The
FCMA seeks to restore and maintain the nation's fisheries by a
two-step process: (1) to extend the jurisdiction of the United States
for the purpose of regulating fisheries in the newly created fishery
conservation zone (FCZ) that extends 200 nautical miles from the
coast; I ' and (2) to develop a comprehensive fishery management
program within the FCZ to be administered by Regional Fishery
Management Councils and the Department of Commerce." 2 Con-
gress realized that this program of conservation and management
was necessary to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks,
to insure conservation and to realize the full potential of the na-
110. MAGNUSON FISHERIES MANAGEMENT AND CONSERVATION ACT, S. REP. No. 416,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1975) [hereinafter cited as MAGNUSON REPORT]. Canada and Mex-
ico have also claimed exclusive fishery zones. See Johnson & Middlemiss, Canada's 200-Mile
Fishing Zone.- The Problem of Compliance, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 67 (1977); Snow, Ex-
tended Fishery Jurisdiction in Canada and the United States, 5 OCEAN DEVL. & INT'L L. 291
(1978); and Szekely, Mexico's Unilateral Claim to a 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone.- Its
International Signicance, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 195 (1977).
111. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801(b) (1), 1811 (West Supp. 1980).
112. Id. § 1801(b) (5). The Act creates eight councils, as follows: New England, mid-
Atlantic, South Atlantic, Caribbean, Gulf, Pacific, North Pacific and Western Pacific. Id.
§ 1852(a).
While the total council membership depends on the regions and the number of states
involved, the following council members were designated by the Act: (1) the principal state
official with responsibility for marine fishery management from each State in the region; (2)
the regional director of the National Marine Fisheries Service; (3) one qualified person per
State to be nominated by the Governor and selected by the Secretary of Commerce; and (4)
additional qualified individuals to be appointed at large by the Secretary of Commerce from
nominations by the Governor, the number of which depends on the number of states that are
members of the council. Id. § 1852(b). Nonvoting members of each council include the
regional or area director of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the commander of
the United States Coast Guard district, the executive director of the Marine Fisheries Com-
mission, and a representative of the Department of State. Id. § 1852(c). For a discussion on
the regional fishery management councils, see Pontecorvo, Fishery Management and the Gen-
eral Welfare." Implications ofthe New Structure, 52 WASH. L. REV. 641 (1977).
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tion's fishery resources.' 13
The Act is organized in four titles. Title I authorizes fishery
management. Title II outlines the conditions under which foreign
fishing is permitted in the fishery conservation zone. Title III speci-
fies the management powers of the Act, including the establishment
of regional fishery management councils to prepare fishery
management plans. Finally, Title IV addresses the effect of an
UNCLOS treaty on the Act.
The Fishery Conservation Zone (FCZ) established in Title I
extends from the individual State's seaward boundaries to a line
drawn 200 miles from the baseline of the territorial sea."' The
States retain authority over the fisheries within the three nautical
mile territorial sea." 5 Within the FCZ the United States exercises
exclusive fishery management authority over all fish," I6 with the ex-
ception of highly migratory species defined in the Act." 7 This in-
cludes all anadromous species that spawn in United States waters,
except when they are within foreign territorial seas or fishery con-
servation zones recognized by the United States" t8 and all Conti-
nental Shelf fishery resources beyond the zone." 9
Title II enumerates the conditions under which foreign fishing
may be conducted in the FCZ 2° requiring: (1) an existing interna-
tional fishery agreement currently in force (such fishing may con-
tinue until the agreement expires or is renegotiated)' 2 1 or the nation
enters into a governing international fishery agreement with the
United States; 122 (2) a permit issued annually by the Secretary of
113. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(6) (West Supp. 1980).
114. Id. § 1811.
115. Id. § 1856. Comment, The Fishery Conservation andManagement Act of 1976. State
Regulation of Fishing Beyond The Territorial Sea, 31 MAINE L. REV. 303 (1980).
116. Id. § 1812(1).
117. Id. §§ 1813, 1802(14).
118. Id. § 1812(2). For a discussion on the management of anadromous fish stocks see
Copes, The Law of the Sea and Management of Anadromous Fish Stocks, 4 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 233 (1977).
119. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1812(3) (West Supp. 1980).
120. The restriction on foreign fishing is to correct the fact that in 1960 the United States
took 92.9 percent of the total catch off the Atlantic coast but by 1972 the United States' share
of the total Atlantic catch had declined to 49.1 percent. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 22, at 34,
reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 607.
121. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(b) (West Supp. 1980).
122. Id. § 1821(c). Each Governing International Fishery Agreement (GIFA) shall ac-
knowledge the exclusive fishery management authority of the United States, as set forth in
the Act, and shall include a binding commitment on the part of the foreign nation and its
fishing vessels to: (1) abide by all regulations promulgated by the Secretary pursuant to this
Act; (2) permit any officer authorized to enforce the provisions of this Act to board, and
search or inspect, any such vessel at any time, and to make arrests and seizures; (3) permit
Vol. I11
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State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Commerce;' 23 and
(3) reciprocity by the foreign nation to fishing vessels of the United
States. 124 Foreign vessels shall be charged reasonable non-discrim-
inatory license fees for the issuance of a fishing permit. The
amount of such fees are to be based upon the costs of management,
research, administration, enforcement and other factors relating to
the conservation and management of fisheries.
125
Foreign fishermen will be permitted to harvest only that por-
tion of the optimum yield 126 that is not caught by United States
fishermen.127  Preference, therefore, is granted to American
fishermen in allocating the portion of the stocks that may be har-
vested annually. The Secretary of State, in cooperation with the
authorized United States observers on board any such vessel and reimburse the United
States for the cost of such observers; (4) pay in advance any required fees; (5) appoint and
maintain agents within the United States who are authorized to receive and respond to any
legal process issued in the United States; (6) assume responsibility, in accordance with re-
quirements prescribed by the Secretary, for the reimbursement of United States citizens for
any loss of, or damage to, their fishing vessels, fishing gear, or catch which is caused by any
fishing vessel of that nation; and (7) not exceed such nation's allocation of the total allowable
level of foreign fishing. Id. §§ 1821(c) (1)-(4). For a discussion on the Congressional role in
the GIFA's, see Crystal, Congressional Authorization and Oversight of International Fishery
Agreements Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV.
495 (1977).
123. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(a) (West Supp. 1980).
124. The Act states:
Foreign fishing shall not be authorized for the fishing vessels of any foreign nation
unless such nation satisfies the Secretary and the Secretary of State that such nation
extends substantially the same fishing privileges to fishing vessels of the United
States, if any, as the United States extends to foreign fishing vessels.
Id. § 1821(g).
This "reciprocity provision" is known as the Bentsen amendment, and was added to the
Act as an incentive for foreign governments to extend similar privileges to United States
fishing vessels. See Hearings in Regard to HR. 2564 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation ofthe House Comm on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 166 (1977) (unpublished) (remarks of Rep. Robert L. Leggett); and Comment, Foreign
Access to U.S Fisheries in the Wake ofthe Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 18 VA.
J. INT'L L. 513, 519 (1979).
125. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1824(b) (10) (West Supp. 1980). For a discussion on fees and access
controls under the FCMA, see Anderson & Wilson, Economic Dimensions ofFees andAccess
Control Under the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 701
(1977); Burke, Recapture of Economic Rent Under the FCMA Sections 303-304 on Permits
and Fees, 52 WASH. L. REV. 681 (1977); Christy, The Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of1976. Management Objectives and the Distribution ofBenefits and Costs, 52 WASH. L.
REV. 657 (1977).
126. The Act defines "optimum yield" as the amount of fish "(A) which will provide the
greatest overall benefit to the Nation, with particular reference to food production and recre-
ational opportunities; and (B) which is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum
sustainable yield from such fishery, as modified by any relevant economic, social, or ecologi-
cal factor." 16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(18) (West Supp. 1980).
127. Id. § 1821(d); see also Id. § 1853(a) (4).
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Secretary of Commerce, shall determine the allocation among for-
eign nations of the total allowable level of foreign fishing within the
FCZ. In making such determinations, the Secretary of State and
the Secretary of Commerce shall consider whether and to what ex-
tent the foreign nation has traditionally engaged in fishing within
the FCZ; 2 and whether the foreign nation has cooperated with the
United States in fishery research and the conservation and manage-
ment of fishery resources.'
29
The management powers of the FCMA are enumerated in
Title III. The Act establishes eight Regional Fishery Management
Councils whose principal function is to formulate fishery manage-
ment plans upon which management and conservation regulations
are to be based. Each fishery management plan must be developed
in accordance with national standards 30 and contain provisions to
govern both foreign and domestic fishing.' 31 They must contain a
description of the fishery,132 an assessment of present and probable
future conditions of the fishery (including both maximum sustaina-
ble yield and optimum yield), 33 the capacity of United States ves-
sels to harvest the optimum yield and the portion of the optimum
128. The Act recognized the special interests of distant-water fishing nations, like Japan,
who have traditionally engaged in fishing within the newly created FCA.
129. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e) (West Supp. 1980).
130. The Act provides that any fishery management plan prepared, and any regulation
promulgated to implement any such plan shall be consistent with the following national
standards for fishery conservation and management:
(1) Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while
achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery.
(2) Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best scien-
tific information available.
(3) To the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a
unit throughout its range, and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit
or in close coordination.
(4) Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between resi-
dents of different States. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privi-
leges among various United States fishermen, such allocation shall be (A) fair and
equitable to all such fishermen; (B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation;
and (C) carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or
other entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges.
(5) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, promote ef-
ficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure shall
have economic allocation as its sole purpose.
(6) Conservation and management measures shall take into account and allow for
variations among, and contingencies in, fisheries, fishery resources, and catches.
(7) Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, minimize
costs and avoid unnecessary duplication.
Id. § 185 1(a). See also Id. § 1853(a)(1)(c).
131. Id. § 1853(a)(2).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 1853(a)(3).
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yield that can be made available for foreign fishing. 134 The plans
may also require United States fishermen to obtain a permit and
pay a fee to fish in the FCZ, 35 prohibit or limit fishing by United
States vessels, 36 limit the catch of fish, 137 restrict the type of fishing
equipment, 38 establish a system for limiting access to the fishery to
achieve optimum yield 39 and prescribe measures necessary for
conservation and management. 40 Although the Regional Coun-
cil's may submit to the Secretary of Commerce proposed regula-
tions that would implement the management plans, 4 1 it is the
Secretary who must promulgate and implement the regulations.
142
The Secretary of Commerce has sixty days to review and notify the
Regional Council of its approval, disapproval, or partial disap-
proval of management plans.1 43 Once a plan is approved it is pub-
lished in the Federal Register, '4 and after hearings 45  and
administrative action, goes into effect. The enforcement provisions
of the FCMA 146 include civil penalties, 47 criminal penalties 48 and
134. Id. § 1853(a)(4). This provision of the FCMA has been adopted by UNCLOS pro-
posals. See ICNT supra note 92, art. 61(1) and art. 62(2).
135. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(1) (West Supp. 1980).
136. Id. § 1853(b)(2).
137. Id. § 1853(b)(3).
138. Id. § 1853(b)(4).
139. In establishing a system for limiting access to the fishery in order to achieve opti-
mum yield, the Council and the Secretary must take into account the following:
(A) present participation in the fishery,
(B) historical fishing practices in, and dependence on, the fishery;
(C) the economics of the fishery,
(D) the capability of fishing vessels used in the fishery to engage in other fisheries,
(E) the cultural and social framework relevant to the fishery, and
(F) any other relevant considerations.
Id. § 1853(b)(6). This provision is one of several that acknowledges the historical fishing
practices of nations like Japan, in the newly created FCZ. See also note 129 supra.
140. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1853(b)(7) (West Supp. 1980).
141. Id. § 1853(c).
142. Id. § 1855(c).
143. Id. § 1854(a).
144. Id. § 1855(a).
145. Id. § 1855(b).
146. The prohibited acts are enumerated in Id. § 1857, and the powers of authorized law
enforcement officers are set forth in Id. §§ 1861(b)-(c).
The provisions of the FCMA are primarily enforced by the United States Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard estimated it would cost $87.5 million in acquisition and reactivation costs
for the equipment that would be needed to enforce the provisions of the FCMA, and another
$56 million in annual operating funds. Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 309 (letter to
Senator John Sparkman, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Adm. Owen
W. Siles, Commandant, United States Coast Guard, dated October 31, 1975). For a discus-
sion on enforcement of the FCMA see Fidell, Enforcement ofthe Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of1976: The Policeman's Lot, 52 WASH. L. REV. 513 (1977); and Venzke,
Fishery Conservation and Management Act Enforcement: A Coast Guard Perspective, in Ex-
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civil forfeitures of vessels, equipment and fish.'4 9
Title IV of the Act deals with the effect of an UNCLOS treaty
and provides that if the United States ratifies a comprehensive
UNCLOS treaty which includes provisions on fishery conservation
and management jurisdiction, the Secretary of Commerce, after
consultation with the Secretary of State, may promulgate amend-
ments to the regulations adopted under the FCMA if such amend-
ments are necessary and appropriate to make the Act's regulations
conform to the Law of the Sea treaty.' 50 Since the Secretary's au-
thority to amend the FCMA is discretionary,' 5 ' an UNCLOS treaty
would not automatically preempt conflicting FCMA provisions.
B. The Debate
The proponents of the FCMA, who included coastal fishing
interests emphasized that:'5 2 (1) stocks of fish of direct interest and
importance to United States fishermen have been overfished; 153 (2)
the over-fishing of these stocks of fish are in large measure attribu-
TENDED FISHERY JURISDICTION: PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS, 1977 34 (Proceedings of the
North Carolina Governor's Conference on Fishery Management under Extended Jurisdic-
tion) (K. Jurgensen & A. Covington eds. 1978). (Mr. Venzke was Rear Admiral, Chief, Of-
fice of Operations United States Coast Guard Headquarters).
147. The amount of the civil penalty shall not exceed $25,000 for each violation, and
each day of a continuing violation shall constitute a separate offense. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1858(a)
(West Supp. 1980).
148. Criminal punishment may include a fine, imprisonment or both. Id. § 1859.
The United Nations proposal on enforcement of laws within the EEZ does not include
imprisonment as permissible punishment unless there is an agreement to the contrary by the
States concerned. ICNT article 73 states:
Article 73. Enforcement of laws and regulations of the coastal State
1. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit,
conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such
measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may
be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws and regulations enacted by it in
conformity with the present Convention.
2. Arrested vessels and their crews shall be promptly released upon the posting of
reasonable bond or other security.
3. Coastal State penalties for violations of fisheries regulations in the exclusive
economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of agreement to the
contrary by the States concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment.
4. In cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly
notify, through apropriate channels, the flag State of the action taken and of any
penalties subsequently imposed.
ICNT, supra note 88, art. 73, reprinted in Krueger and Nordquist, supra note 88, at 388-89.
149. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1860(a) (West Supp. 1980).
150. Id. § 1881.
151. Id.
152. For a summary of the arguments proponents advanced in favor of the FCMA see
MAGNUSON REPORT, supra note 110, at 17.
153. Id.; see also 16 U.S.C.A. §. 1801(a)(2) (West Supp. 1980).
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table to massive foreign fishing efforts in waters immediately off the
shores of the United States; 54 (3) international fishery agreements
to which the United States is party and which purport to regulate
and control fishing efforts on overfished stocks have been ineffec-
tive in that goal;' 55 (4) an acceptable international agreement on
marine fisheries management jurisdiction will be negotiated,
signed, ratified and implemented only after a long delay, during
which overfishing would continue to occur; 56 and (5) therefore, the
United States in its own interest and in the interest of preserving
threatened stocks of fish must take emergency action to manage,
regulate and control fishing within 200 nautical miles of its
shore."' Advocates of the Act also noted that the world commu-
nity is ready to adopt a 200-mile limit; 158 that there is a need for
management and conservation in an extended fisheries zone on the
Federal level;1 59 and that the FCMA will ultimately reduce interna-
tional fishing disputes. 16
0
Some proponents argue that coastal nations should be allowed,
even encouraged in some instances, to implement protective conser-
vation measures if: the protective action is in response to a demon-
strable conservation crisis; the protective action is concerned solely
with protection of the endangered resource; it does not unreasona-
bly discriminate against nations; the protective action automatically
terminates and is accompanied by a call for international agree-
ment.161
The FCMA conforms to the criterion for protective action and
is essentially a temporary law designed to deal with the emergency
situation that exists and will continue to exist until an international
agreement is reached. The Act does not intend to interfere with or
preempt pending negotiations aimed at such a treaty, but rather
154. Id.; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(3) (West Supp. 1980).
155. Id.; see also 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(4) (West Supp. 1980).
156. Id.
157. Id. § 1801(a)(1).
158. MAGNUSON REPORT, supra note 110, at 10-11.
159. Id. at 15-16. See also Comment, Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.
an Accommodation ofState, Federal, and International Interests, 10 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
703 (1978).
160. Congressional proponents of the Act argued that international fishing disputes
would be reduced because it "[would) begin the path to stabilization of coastal fishery man-
agement limits and bring about more certain rules for the conduct of fishing operations. And
• . . the bill will provide an incentive to concluding, as soon as possible, a comprehensive
law of the sea treaty, the preferred solution to the question of fishery jurisdiction."
MAGNUSON REPORT, supra note 110, at 16-17.
161. Jacobson, supra note 70, at 457.
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seeks to preserve the fisheries until an international agreement is in
force. 62 Coastal fishing interests stressed that fishery resources are
finite but renewable. If placed under sound management before
overfishing has caused irreversible effects, the fisheries can be re-
stored and maintained for the benefit of the United States and the
international community. 163
The opponents to the legislation included the executive
branch,t 4 the distant-water tuna and shrimp fishermen 65 as well
as some members of Congress. 66 They objected to the legislation
because 67 unilateral action by the United States could seriously
162. The FCMA declared that it was Congressional policy to. support and encourage
continued active United States efforts to obtain an internationally acceptable treaty, at the
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which provides for effective conservation
and management of fishery resources. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(c)(5) (West Supp. 1980).
163. Id. § 1801(a)(5).
164. At a special meeting of the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries, President Ford stated: "I am strongly opposed to unilateral claims by nations to
jurisdiction on the high seas." Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 153 (statement by President
Ford at September 22, 1975, ICNAF meeting). Secretary of State Kissinger, in an address to
the annual meeting of the American Bar Association in Montreal, on August I1, stated that
"[U]nilateral action is both extremely dangerous and incompatible with the thrust of the
[Law of the Seal negotiations .. " He added:
The United States has consistently resisted the unilateral claims of other nations,
and others will almost certainly resist ours. Unilateral legislation on our part would
almost surely prompt others to assert extreme claims of their own. Our ability to
negotiate an acceptable international consensus on the economic zone will be jeop-
ardized. If every state proclaims its own rules of law and seeks to impose them on
others, the very basis of international law will be shaken, ultimately to our own
detriment.
Reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 300.
165. In a letter from Harold F. Cary, Tuna Research Foundation, Inc., to Senator John
Sparkman, Mr. Cary, on behalf of American distant-water fishermen stated: "S.961 (FCMA
legislation) will not work. It will create international confrontations. It will sacrifice our
high seas distant water fisheries off other coasts. The United States will lose more than it
hopes to gain." Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 352 (series of letters to Senator John
Sparkman, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Harold F. Cary, Tuna Re-
search Relations Committee Inc., dated October 13, 1975).
166. Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska originally cosponsored the 200-mile bill but later
changed his mind and opposed it. Senator Gravel submitted a series of fact sheets which
purported to show that the enactment of the FCMA would result in an overall loss of $288
million and approximately 60,000 jobs. Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 139 (S.961 Fact
Sheet No. 2 submitted by Senator Gravel). Senators Warren Magnuson, Washington, and
Ted Stevens, Alaska, submitted a lengthy memorandum of rebuttal to the fact sheets
presented by Senator Gravel See Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 180-93 (letter to Sena-
tor Clairborne Pell from Senators Warren Magnuson and Ted Stevens, dated November 7,
1975, enclosing memorandum in rebuttal concerning Senator Mike Gravel's statement on
S.961).
167. These objections were listed in HousE REPORT, supra note 22, at 23; reprinted in
11976] U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 595. The most consistent criticism against the
FCMA was that it represented "unilateral" United States action to address an international
issue. For an interesting discussion on unilateral acts in international affairs see Theberge,
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undermine efforts in the Law of the Sea Conference and hamper
chances for a satisfactory multilateral settlement of the fisheries
question."' In addition, they believed that such unilateral action
runs counter to established fundamental principles of international
law' 69 and would encourage similar jurisdictional claims by other
countries, thereby prejudicing United States distant-water fishing
interests such as tuna and shrimp. 7 ' If distant-water nations re-
Unilateralism." The Direct Challenge To International Law, 9 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 553 (1979).
Mr. Theberge characterized United States unilateral action in the following manner. "Each
unilateral effort has several features in common: (1) the position adopted assumes a very
high moral purpose; (2) it is taken by the United States either without a realistic assessment
or consideration of the international impact or, after consideration, the international impact
is discounted in the political process; (3) it will affect international law and policy; (4) it is
likely to create conflict and be self-defeating; and (5) it fails to assess the needs and aspira-
tions of other nations and the obvious limits of United States influence abroad." Id. at 55.
For additional readings on the effect of unilateral action in international affairs see Biggs,
Deep Seabed Mining and Unilateral Legislation, 8 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 223 (1980); and
McCloskey & Losch, U.N. Law of the Sea Conference and the US. Congress: Will Pending
U.S. UnilateralAction on Deep Seabed Mining Destroy Hopefor a Treaty?, I Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 240 (1979).
168. Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 159-62 (prepared statement of Hon. John Norton
Moore, Chairman, National Security Council Interagency Task Force on the Law of the
Sea); Id. at 319-21 (letter to Senator John Sparkman, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee from Jonathan I. Charney, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University,
dated October 6, 1975).
169. Id. For a discussion on the potential conflicts between a future LOS treaty and the
FCMA see Jacobson & Cameron, Potential Conflicts Between a Future Law of the Sea Treaty
and the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 451 (1977).
The United States unilateral extension of fishery jurisdiction is supported, in part, by the
United Nations Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285. Article 6(1) of the
Fishing Convention recognized that "a coastal State has a special interest in the maintenance
of the productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territo-
rial sea." Article 7 of the Convention provides coastal States the authority to adopt unilateral
conservation measures.
Article 7
1. Having regard to the provisions of paragraph 1 of article 6, any coastal State
may with a view to the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources of
the sea, adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate to any stock of fish
or other marine resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea,
provided that negotiations to that effect with the other States concerned have not
led to an agreement within six months.
2. The measures which the coastal State adopts under the previous paragraph
shall be valid as to other States only if the following requirements are fulfilled:
(a) That there is a need for urgent application of conservation measures in
the light of the existing knowledge of the fishery;
(b) That the measures adopted as based on appropriate scientific findings;
(c) That such measures.do not discriminate in form or in fact against foreign
fisherman.
170. Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 322-25 (letter, with attachments, to Senator John
Sparkman, Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee from Harold F. Cary, General
Manager, Administration, Ocean Fisheries, Inc., dated October 9, 1975).
32
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 1 [1981], Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol11/iss1/10
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
fused to recognize our unilateral claims' 7 ' serious foreign policy
and enforcement problems could result. This is due in part to the
lack of certain provisions in the FCMA which are contained in the
United States proposal at the Law of the Sea Conference include
consideration of the diverse interests of the international commu-
nity and compulsory dispute settlement, 72 both of which are neces-
sary to protect the interests of all states and the international
community in general.
The divergent fisheries interests within the United States
makes a comprehensive national fishing policy inherently difficult.
American coastal fishermen are strong advocates of a fisheries zone
that will provide them with preferential rights within 200 miles of
the nations shore. The interests of American distant-water
fishermen, such as the tuna and shrimp fishermen, run almost di-
rectly counter."" The American tuna-fishing fleet depends on ac-
cess to wide-ranging tuna schools frequently found within 200
miles of the shores of other countries. Shrimp fishermen, who ac-
count for almost twenty-five percent of the total United States catch
in terms of dollar value, are also dependent on fishing grounds
within the 200-mile limits of Mexico, Guyana and Brazil. 74 Thus,
American distant-water fishermen opposed the legislation because
they feared that unilateral action on the part of the United States
would trigger further unilateral action on the part of certain foreign
171. One argument advanced by opponents of the FCMA was that other nations will not
respect the extension of American fisheries jurisdiction and that accordingly, there is a risk of
conflict, particularly with the Soviet Union and Japan. Id. at 74 (remarks of Senator Pell).
172. Article 59 of the ICNT provides that conflicts among States over their rights within
an EEZ should be resolved on the "basis of equity."
Article 59
Basis for the resolution of conflicts regarding the attribution of rights and juris-
diction in the exclusive economic zone.
In cases where the present Convention does not attribute rights of jurisdiction
to the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone, and a
conflict arises between the interests of the coastal State and any other State or
States, the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of the
relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the inter-
ests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.
ICNT, supra note 88, art. 59, reprinted in Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 88, at 381. See
also Rosenne, Settlement of Fisheries Disputes in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 73 AM. J.
INT'L L. 89 (1979).
173. See generally Fisher, Wood, & Burge, Latin American Unilateral Declarations of 200-
Mile Offshore Exclusive Fisheries. Towards Resolving the Problems of Access Faced by the
U.S. Tunafish Industry, 9 Sw. U. L. REV. 643 (1977) and Comment, The 200-Mile Exclusive
Economic Zone. Death Knellfor the American Tuna Industry, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 707
(1976).
174. Swing, supra note 40, at 538.
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nations, preventing their continued fishing in such waters and caus-
ing the demise of their industries.
Such fears have proven justified. Within two years after pas-
sage of the FCMA eighty-six other countries followed suit and
claimed jurisdiction to offshore living resources. 7 5 Mexico's claim
has resulted in the rapid and absolute phase out of United States
shrimp vessels from the Gulf of Mexico.' 76
C Industry Performance Since the FCMA
Although the FCMA is primarily a conservation and manage-
ment statute, it was also designed to provide priority access for
United States fishermen to the fishery resources, thereby assisting in
the development of the United States fishing industry.'7 7 However,
the performance of the United States fishing industry since the en-
actment of the FCMA has been disappointing. The following table
illustrates the volume and the value of the harvests by United
States and foreign fishermen in the FCZ in the years 1976-1979:78
Volume in thousands of metric tons and percent of total
U.S. landings Foreign catch Total
1976 720 (23%) 2,368 (77%) 3,088
1977 689 (29%) 1,699 (71%) 2,388
1978 641 (27%) 1,754 (73%) 2,395
1979 803 (33%) 1,641 (67%) 2,444
Value (estimate) in millions of dollars and percent of total
U.S. landings Foreign catch Total
1976 561 (56%) 433 (44%) 994
1977 689 (60%) 445 (40%) 1,134
1978 641 (58%) 460 (42%) 1,101
.1979 945 (66%) 470 (34%) 1,415
175. AMERICAN FISHERIES REPORT, supra note 31, at 71 (Dissenting Views of Congress-
man Paul N. M'Closkey, Jr.).
176. In accordance with the United States-Mexico Fisheries Agreement, which entered
into force November 24, 1976, hundreds of United States vessels were forced out of the rich
nearby Mexican shrimping grounds. This produced an intensification of competition for
shrimp in United States waters.
The Gulf of Mexico shrimp industry is encountering severe difficulties as a result of the
Mexican 200-mile zone, high fuel costs, competition from subsidized foreign imports, and
bad weather. This industry has been described as "in a disaster situation." Id. at 18.
177. It has been estimated that full development of United States fishery resources by
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As indicated by the table, the growth of the United States har-
vest has been slow. In 1979, American fishermen harvested only
thirty-three percent of the fish by volume and thirty-six percent by
value within the United States FCZ. Adjusted to take into account
the decreased total catch since 1976, the United States displacement
of foreign fishing by volume of fish harvested in the FCZ has been
only one percent per year. That one percent by volume translates
to less than three percent by value. ' 79 While the volume of the for-
eign catch has decreased, the value of the foreign catch has actually
increased by thirty-seven million dollars since 1976.
Growth in the United States fish processing industry has also
been slow. The following table illustrates this point.1
80





This represents an increase of approximately eleven percent per
year and given the high rate of inflation, the increase probably does
not represent real growth.' I1
While the growth in American exports of fishery products has
been substantial, the increase in imports has been greater. This is
illustrated in the following% table.'
8 2
[In millions of dollars]
Imports Exports Net
1976 2,277 382.0 -1,895.0
1977 2,621 520.5 -1,900.5
1978 3,099 905.5 -2,193.5
1979 3,811 1,082.4 -2,728.6
The result has been an expanding fisheries trade deficit for the
United States. The $2.7 billion deficit in 1979 accounted for ap-
proximately ten percent of the total United States negative trade
American fishermen and processors would contribute over one billion dollars per year to the
national economy, make the United States a net exporter of fish products, and lead to the
employment of 43,000 persons. Id.
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balance. At the consumer level, of the $12.6 billion spent in the
United States on fish products in 1979, $6.3 billion, or fifty percent,
was on imports. Thus, with twenty percent of the world's fishery
resources located off American coasts, the United States imports
substantial quantities of fish products.1
8 3
There are several reasons for the disappointing performance of
America's fishing industry since the enactment of the FCMA. 84
These reasons are addressed below.
1. Foreign fishing in the FCZ. As noted above, foreign fishing
has not been substantially reduced since the enactment of the
FCMA. It has been argued that while foreign nations are able to
continue a high level of fishing in the FCZ, they are able at the
same time to deny United States fishermen access to their markets.
This seriously hampers the development of the United States fish-
ing industry, and pressure is therefore building for a complete
phase-out of foreign fishing within the FCZ.
2. Market access. Improved access for American fish prod-
ucts to foreign markets is essential to the development of the
United States fishing industry. United States exports of fish prod-
ucts encounter severe trade barriers abroad, particularly in Ja-
pan. 8 5 Japan maintains a system of import quotas, exclusive of
183. Twenty percent of the fish products (by value) that enter world commerce from over
eighty nations are shipped to the United States. Id. at 17-18.
184. Congress is considering legislation to amend the FCMA to promote the develop-
ment of America's fishing industry. The House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee
recently passed H.R. 7039, the "American Fisheries Promotion Act of 1980." The Bill con-
tains four provisions antithetical to Japanese interests. The legislation would provide for: 1)
increased fees on foreign fishing within the FCMA; 2) establishment of a phase-out mecha-
nism for foreign fishing within the United States fisheries zone with an automatic fifteen
percent reduction of such fishing beginning in 1981 and reductions of ten or fifteen incre-
ments in future years, depending on the increased harvests by domestic fishermen (thus, the
bill provides that all foreign fishing in the United States zone will be prohibited by 1990, if
United States fishermen harvest at least fifty percent of the amount denied the foreign
fishermen in the previous year); 3) establishment of an express link between improved access
to foreign markets and allocations of surplus fish to foreign nations; and 4) establishment of
a 100 percent observer coverage on all foreign vessels within the United States fisheries zone.
lfd. at 15-16.
Congressman Don Young (R-Alaska) cosponsored the proposed legislation. The bill
has been characterized by Congressman Paul M'Closkey as an "[Ulnabashed barrel of
pork." Congressman M'Gloskey also stated that "[Tihe bill is a turkey. Stripping away the
patriotic trappings and unnecessary sections leaves only provisions with very adverse foreign
policy implications and new subsidies to a yet unknown group in amounts which cannot be
predicted." Id. at 69, 73 (Dissenting Views of Congressman Paul M'Closkey, Jr.).
185. Japan is the largest harvester of fish in the FCZ. In 1979, Japan took seventy-two
percent, by value, and sixty-eight percent, by volume, of all of the fish harvested by foreign
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restrictive import licenses and high import tariffs that limit imports
of United States fish products. '8 6 If full development of the United
States fishing industry is to be achieved, greater access to Japanese
markets is necessary. 87 Thus far Japan has resisted easing restric-
tions on American imports of fishing products.
3. Enforcement. United States enforcement of the FCMA's
regulations is essential if full development of America's fishing in-
dustry is to be achieved. However, the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS) and the Coast Guard lack the capability to satisfy
all FCMA enforcement requirements. As a National Marine Fish-
eries Service memorandum dated May 14, 1980, points out:
Twelve major violations of foreign fishing regulations, all involv-
ing the attempted concealment of total catches by erroneous en-
tries into ships' logs, made 1979 the worst year yet for such
activities under the FCMA. Eleven of these violations occurred
in water off Alaska, and when combined, the retention and con-
cealment of several thousand metric tons of fish seriously frus-
trates our efforts to effectively conserve and manage our
resources. The violations depict underlogging as ranging from
25 to 60 percent of the total catch on board, a serious and repeti-
tive effort at non-compliance with the FCMA.
18 8
In response to the increase of serious violations, NMFS has in-
fishermen in the United States FCZ. Japan's harvest was 1,184,420.3 metric tons, valued at
$297 million. According to NMFS, this is an increase for Japan of $87 million over the value
of its 1976 catch in the same area. Id. at 30-31.
186. One government report explains:
Despite marketing opportunities in Japan, tariff and non-tariff trade barriers ham-
per U.S. marketing efforts there. Japan maintains a tariff of between five and
fifteen percent on most imported fresh and frozen fish, including pollock. Non-
tariff restrictions, such as import quotas, present an even more important barrier to
U.S. exports to Japan . . . In 1978 Japan's dollar volume import quota (for
groundfish) was $20 million for 98 countries, including the United States. The limi-
tation is on all bottomfish, including pollock. However, using pollock alone as an
exemple, the $20 million limitation, which is spread over 98 nations, represents a
harvest of 90,000 metric tons (using the ex-vessel price of pollock established by
NMFS at 50 CFR 611.32(b)). Given that the development of the U.S. pollock re-
source requires U.S. access to Japan's market, this import quota effecti%,ely pre-
cludes development of the U.S. industry, particularly since Japan's 1979 harvest of
pollock in the U.S. FCZ was 779,003.6 metric tons.
The quota and licensing arrangements in Japan result in heavy control of imports
by the major Japan trading companies, which also enjoy preferential financial links
to banks and can outbid smaller concerns. Prices and supplies can be manipulated.
Id. at 31.
187. The growth of the United States fishing industry will depend to a considerable ex-
tent on access to Japanese markets. In 1979, Japan imported more than fifty percent of
United States fish exports, $568 million out of a total of $1.082 billion. For the period,
January-April 1980, United States exports to Japan declined by $8.9 million from the same
period last year (that is, from $75.4 million to $66.5 million). Id. at 32.
188. Id. at 33-34.
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creased its enforcement. The NMFS memo of May 14, 1980 goes
on to state: "This [enforcement] emphasis has resulted in exposing
what appears .to be a formidable and possibly pre-planned effort at
non-compliance with the [FCMA] regulations .... ,,89
It is not difficult to understand why violations of the FCMA
are so numerous and why more enforcement is needed. The
NMFS has only eighty-four personnel assigned to enforcement of
the FCMA. They can only cover twenty to twenty-five percent of
Coast Guard trips. Further, the Coast Guard has few vessels
(somewhere between five and nine) to enforce the FCMA and
NMFS has only four vessels available for that duty. Some 562
boardings of foreign fishing vessels were made by United States
enforcement officials in 1979 and 127 through May of 1980. In
1979, Coast Guard costs to enforce the FCMA (and to a minor ex-
tent, other fisheries laws and international agreements) were about
$98 million. NMFS's enforcement costs were $6.4 million. 190
To supplement the enforcement efforts of the NMFS and the
Coast Guard, Congress is considering requiring the placement of
100 percent observer coverage on board foreign fishing vessels
while fishing within the United States zone. The cost of such cover-
age would be borne by foreign fishing vessels operating in the











As of mid-May 1980, NMFS reported five serious underloggings in percentages ranging from
seventeen to thirty-five. There were seventeen major violations in 1979 and 1980, a major










190. Id. at 34-35.
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FCZ.19 1
4. Fees on foreign fishermen. The FCMA provides that rea-
sonable non-discriminatory license fees shall be charged foreign
vessels for the privilege of fishing within the FCZ. 92 It has been
argued that this system does not fairly return to the United States
government the value of the foreign catch in the FCZ. This is illus-
trated by the fact that in 1979 the United States taxpayers bore
eighty percent of the cost of the FCMA, more than $145 million.
However, foreign fishermen caught thirty-four percent of the value
of the total fish harvest in the FCZ, worth $470 million. Less fees
to the United States government, the benefit for foreign fishermen
was more than $455 million. 193 Thus, many believe that foreign
fishermen should pay an increased share of the costs of the
FCMA.
194
191. Presently, observer coverage within the FCZ is limited. Overall observer coverage
is on 17.1% off Alaska, 22.1% in the South Atlantic and 23.2% in the mid-Atlantic and New
England area. Id. at 34.
192. See note 126 supra.
193. AMERICAN FISHERIES REPORT, supra note 31, at 36.
194. The total cost of administering fishing off United States coasts in 1979 is prelimina-
rily estimated by NMFS and the Coast Guard as follows:





Fisheries enforcement system 500
International office 100
Economics and statistics 7,400
Fishery management councils 8,838
Office of Conservation and Management 532
Management plan review 499
Permits and regulations 316
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The mere establishment of the 200-mile zone by the FCMA
has not resulted in a rapid expansion of the United States fishing
industry. If the United States fishing industry is to achieve full util-
ization of fishery resources there must be reduced foreign fishing in
the FCZ; greater market access for fish products, particularly in Ja-
pan; more effective enforcement by United States agencies, includ-
ing an expanded observer program; and increased fees on foreign
fishing vessels to pay for the costs of administering the FCMA.
The FCMA does, however, represent a unique approach to
conservation and management of coastal fisheries. It has provided
a foundation for further growth by America's fishing industry, and
presents serious implications for Japan.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FCMA FOR JAPAN
A4. The Importance of the Sea to Japan
The Japanese have a long history of extensive fishing activity
and have enjoyed a developed fishing industry since the beginning
of the eighteenth Century. By 1752 Japanese fishermen had ex-
panded their fishing operations as far north as the Maritime Prov-
ince of Siberia.' In 1972 the Japanese fishing industry was
described by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO) as "the most important, diversified, extensive and far
ranging in the world."1 96
The effectiveness of Japanese fishing efforts has not been with-
out its drawbacks. Japan shares an equally long history of fishery
disputes 9 7 with her competitors and close neighbors, the Soviet
195. Ohira, Fishery Problems Between Soviet Russia and Japan, 2 THE JAPANESE AN-
NUAL OF INT'L L. 1 (1958).
196. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, Country Fishery Profiles (1972);
Wells, Japan and the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 65, 67 (1974).
In 1971, Japan caught 9,890,000 tons, the second largest national catch, after Peru who
caught 10,610,000 tons. In terms of value, however, the Japanese catch was worth about
$3.206 billion whereas that of Peru was about $187 million, less than a sixteenth of Japan's.
Over ninety-five percent of Peru's catch was anchovies for reduction to fish meal. Park,
Fishing Under Troubled Waters- The Northeast Asia Fisheries Controversy, 2 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L. 93, 97 (1974).
197. In promoting Japan's fishing industry after World War II, the Japanese government
took various measures under the slogan of "From coast to offshore, from offshore to distant
waters." Tanaka, Japanese Fisheries and Fishery Resources in the Northwest Pacfic, 6 OCEAN
1981
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Union,'9 8 China, 199 Korea,2°° and the United States. 2°1
DEv. & INT'L L. 163, 164 (1979). Such a policy brought Japan into competition and confron-
tation with other states over fishery resources.
Conflict over ocean fisheries is not new. Fisheries off northwestern Europe were matters
of conflict from early times. For example, English fishermen resented the license granted by
Edward I in 1295 to Zeeland vessels to fish in Yarmouth; and in 1413 the King of England
and the Count of Holland agreed on the appointment of government representatives to stop
repeated clashes between fishermen of their respective nations. The northern seas between
Norway, the Faeroes, Iceland and Greenland have been the scene of prolonged disputes over
maritime jurisdiction and fishery rights since the beginning of the seventeenth Century.
Fawcett, How Free are the Seas?, 49 INT'L AFF. 14, 15 (1973).
The application or threat of armed force to resolve fishery disputes has frequently oc-
curred in modern international affairs. For illustration, a lobster war broke out between
France and Brazil over lobster resources on the Brazilian Continental Shelf; the tuna war
between the United States and several Latin American countries over the tuna, which occa-
sionally roam into and through the 200-mile zones claimed by Central and South American
countries; and the cod war between Iceland and Great Britain caused serious strain within
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. MAGNUSON REPORT, supra note 11, at 7.
One author has postulated that conflict over fishery resources is due to the fact that
fishing is one of the few activities of man in which different nations are in direct competition,
and therefore frequent confrontation, with each other over the same resource. Thus "no-
where in the oceans is there a source of conflict so sustained and prevalent as in the interna-
tional use of marine fisheries." Christy, Fisheries and the New Conventions on the Law ofthe
Sea, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 455, 456-57 (1970).
198. Conflict over fishery relations between Japan and the Soviet Union have been due
to two factors. First, Japan and the Soviet Union have historically claimed different delimi-
tations of the territorial sea, Japan claiming a three-mile limit and the Soviet Union a twelve-
mile limit. Second, fishery disputes between the two countries have been confined to fishing
that took place in the offshore waters of the Soviet Union, which Japan has fished in since
the eighteenth century. However, in 1974-75 Soviet fishing vessels in large numbers com-
menced fishing in waters immediately outside the Japanese three-mile limit and this intru-
sion angered Japanese coastal fishermen who pressed for greater protection. Park, Marine
Resource Conflicts in the North Pacfic, reprinted in MARINE POLICY AND THE COASTAL COM-
MUNITY 215, 222-24 (D. Johnston ed. 1976).
For a general discussion on maritime relations between the Soviet Union and Japan see
Ohira, supra note 196; Oda, Japan and the International Fisheries, 4 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL
OF INT'L. L. 50, 53-56 (1960); Kawakami, Outline ofthe Japan-Soviet Fishery Talks (1962), 7
THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 24 (1963); and Tanaka, supra note 197, at 176-81.
199. The first armed clash between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Japan
over fishery issues occurred in December 1950, when five Japanese fishing vessels were seized
by the PRC in the East China Sea allegedly for violations of what the PRC regarded as its
own fishing grounds. Park, supra note 198, at 216-20.
For studies on ocean relations between Japan and China see generaly Note, Interna-
tional Law and the Sino-Japanese Controversy Over Territorial Sovereignty of the Senkaku
Islands, 52 B. L. REV. 763 (1972); Comment, The East China Sea. The Role of International
Law in the Settlement ofDisputes, 1973 DUKE L. J. 823; Park, supra note 196, at 110-22; Park,
Oil Under Troubled Waters. The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy, 14 HARV. INT'L L. J.
212 (1973); Park, The Sino-Japanese-Korean Sea Resources Controversy and the Hypothesis of
a 200-Mile Economic Zone, 16 HARV. INT'L L. J. 27 (1975); Allen & Mitchell, The Legal
Status ofthe Continental Shelf of the East China Sea, 51 ORE. L. REV. 789 (1972); Nakauchi,
Problems 0/Delimitation in the East China Sea and the Sea ofJapan, 6 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L. 305 (1979); Note, Sino-Japanese Dispute Over the Tiaoyut'ai (Senkaku) Islands, 14 VA. J.
INT'L L. 221 (1974); Ohira & Kuwahara, Fishery Problems Between Japan and the People's
Vol. I I
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Lacking natural resources and arable land,2"2 Japan imports
large quantities of raw materials 203 and foodstuffs.2°4 The majority
Republic of China, 3 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 109 (1959); and Tanaka, supra note
197, at 183-84; Dellapenna & Wong, The Republic ofChina's Claims Relating to the Territorial
Sea, Continental Shelf, and Exclusive Economic Zones.- Legal and Economic Aspects, 3 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 353 (1980).
200. One author has stated: "Fishery relations between Japan and Korea have always
been volatile and, at times, extremely hostile." Traditionally, Korean fishermen have fished
in home waters but their own fishing grounds have been frequented by Japanese fishermen
for centuries. Regulation of Japanese fishing in Korean waters dates back to 1426 and in
1442 the two nations concluded a fisheries treaty for the first time. These agreements author-
ized the increase of Japanese fishermen operating in waters adjacent to Korea. Korean
fishermen resented the increased Japanese presence and the situation culminated in the "Jap-
anese Fishermen's Uprising" of 1510 and the breaking of diplomatic relations between the
two countries. Park, supra note 198, at 219-22. Fishing relations between Korea (North and
South) and Japan have been successfully stabilized through negotiations. However, the com-
petition between fishermen of these countries over a common stock of resources within a
small area will make fishery rights a constant issue in Japanese-Korean relations.
For a general discussion on ocean issues between Japan and Korea see the studies listed
in note 199 supra; and Tanaka, supra note 197, at 181-83.
201. Conflict over fishery relations between Japan and the United States began in 1936
when Japan started surveying Alaskan salmon fisheries in Bristol Bay. Measures were quick-
ly introduced in Congress to restrict Japanese fishing in the North Pacific and Japan with-
drew its surveying operations from Bristol Bay in 1938. Park, supra note 198, at 224-26.
From Japan's surrender in August 1945, until the San Francisco Peace Treaty of April
28, 1952, Japanese fishing was placed under restrictions by the United States. The restrictive
measures were implemented within what came to be called the "MacArthur Line" which
regulated Japanese fishing activity. Article 9 of the treaty obligated Japan to "promptly ne-
gotiate with the allied powers so willing for the conclusion of fisheries agreements." Pursu-
ant to this provision Japan, Canada and the United States held negotiations that concluded
with the creation of the North Pacific Fisheries Convention. By the terms of the convention,
Japan agreed to abstain from fishing for halibut, herring, and salmon in certain waters off the
coasts of North America. This was the origin of the so-called "principle of abstention" by
which Canada and the United States received preference over certain North Pacific fisheries.
Id. at 225.
For a Japanese view of United States-Japan fishery negotiations see Nakamura, The
Japan- United States Negotiations Concerning King Crab Fishery in the Eastern Bering Sea, 9
THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 36 (1965).
202. Japan is an archipelago made up of four large islands and some 4,000 smaller ones
that stretch as an island chain for over 2,000 miles. Over seventy percent of Japan is steep
mountains and most of the country's 117 million people live on only a small portion of the
remaining lowlands area. K. KAWAMURA, FACTS AND FIGURES OF JAPAN, 1980 8, 10 (1980)
(hereinafter cited as KAWAMURA]. JAPAN'S FARMING LAND ACCOUNTS FOR FIFTEEN PER-
CENT OF THE COUNTRY'S TOTAL AREA. Id. at 65.
Japan has argued that "allowing less advantaged countries access to the food resources
in the ocean has played a paramount role in counterbalancing the inequalities in the size of
territorial land among different nations. The ocean always has been available to all nations
that need to rely on that resource for foods. Yonezawa & Suda, supra note 30, at 169.
203. For example, in 1977 foreign sources provided Japan with 99.8 percent of petroleum
consumption, 99.6 percent of iron ore needs and 100 percent nickel and bauxite require-
ments. ECONOMIC AFFAIRS BUREAU, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, STATISTICAL SUR-
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of Japan's foreign trade is transported by sea.2" 5 Japan's shipbuild-
VEY OF JAPAN'S ECONOMY 29 (1972). Table 21: "Import Dependence of Selected Natural
Resources."
In 1977, domestic sources provided Japan with 11.8% of her energy requirements and
imports 88.2%, whereas domestic sources provided the United States with 77.9% of her en-
ergy needs and imports only 22.1%. KAWAMURA, supra note 202, at 70.
Table I-1: "Primary Energy Self-Sufficiency." The following table illustrates Japan's
dependence on oil imports as the major source of Japan's energy supply.
Dependence on Oil Imports and Consumption
in Major Countries
(unit: %)
Ratio of oil in Ratio of imports







West Germany 53.0 94.8
Source: Tsusho hakusho (White Paper on International Trade), Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry, 1979).
Id. at 71.
Japan's "economic miracle" expansion in the 1960's was built on cheap, readily avail-
able oil. Due to the insecurity and high cost of imported oil, estimated at sixty-seven billion
dollars for 1980, the Japanese government will spend $113 billion on alternative energy.
Murray, Japanese Scurrying to Get Out of Oi, The Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 12, 1980,
at 10, col. 1, see also Eguchi, Japanese Energy Policy, 56 INT'L AFF. 263 (1980).
204. Japan's imports of foodstuffs in 1979 amounted to $14.4 billion. MINISTRY OF FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN, THE JAPAN OF TODAY 70 (1980) [hereinafter cited as MINISTRY OF
'FOREIGN AFFAIRS].
205. In 1978, Japan's foreign trade, the majority of which was transported by sea, to-
talled about $177.0 billion. The following table illustrates the growth in Japanese foreign
trade.
Total Exports and Imports (unit: $ million)
Year Exports Imports Balance
1965 8,452 8,169 283
1966 9,776 9,153 254
1967 10,442 11,663 -1,222
1968 12,972 12,987 -16
1969 15,990 15,024 966
1970 19,318 18,881 437
1971 24,019 19,712 4,307
1972 28,591 23,471 5,120
1973 36,930 38,314 -1,384
1974 55,536 62,110 -6,574
1975 55,753 57,863 -2,110
1976 67,225 64,799 2,427
1977 80,495 70,809 9,686
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ing industry is the world's largest2" and fish provide over half the
animal protein in the national diet.20 7 As an island nation the sea is
Total Exports and Imports (unit: $ million)
Year Exports Imports Balance
1978 97,543 79,343 18,200
Source: Gaikoku boeki gaikyo (The Summary Report-Trade of Japan), Ministry
of Finance, February 1979.
Reprinted in KAWAMURA, supra note 202, at 46.




























MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 204, at 142-43. Table on "Foreign Trade by
Areas and Countries 1979."
206. In 1976 forty-six percent of worldwide ship construction was completed in Japanese
yards. Id. at 63.
207. The significance of fish in the national diet of the major maritime countries is shown
in the following table:
Fish as Percent of Protein Supply in the Major Maritime Countries
Fish as per cent Fish as per cent
of total of animal















The Netherlands 2.8 4.4
FAO, Dept. of Fisheries, The Economic and Social Effects of the Fihing Industry--
A Comparative Study, Rome, FAO, 1973, Doc. No. FIE/C/314, Table I, at 3-5.
Miles, The Dynamics of Global Ocean Politics, reprinted in MARINE POLICY AND THE
COASTAL COMMUNITY 147, 170 (D. Johnston ed. 1976).
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crucial to the defense of Japan.20 8
The head of the Japanese delegation explained the importance
of the sea to Japan during the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law
of the Sea:
Japanese territory, supporting some 90 million people, consists of
small mountainous islands with but very small arable space and
meagre natural resources. Consequently, the life of the Japanese
people depends heavily upon the sea, which is the source of live-
lihood for a large segment of the population.20 9
The remarks made by the chairman of Japan's Fisheries Associa-
tion to members of the United States North Pacific Fisheries Man-
agement Council, (a body which has a major voice in establishing
new quotas for foreign fishing within the FCZ) illustrates the sig-
nificance Japan places on open fishing and its opposition to the
FCMA. The Council was warned that "America would be play-
ing into the hands of Japanese Communists if Japan is not given
special consideration in implementation of the 200-mile
limit .... 1 0 The Japanese delegation reasoned that "[u]sing the
extended offshore jurisdiction to reduce Japan's fishing quotas in
the North Pacific could cause massive unemployment and political
upheaval. '21 1 The Council was further told that "[W]e need very
208. The introduction of the steam engine in the eighteenth century and the development
of the whaling industry in the North Pacific in the beginning of the nineteenth century
brought foreign vessels into the seas surrounding Japan. China's defeat in the Opium War
(1840-1842) by the European "barbarians" made the Japanese aware of their need for sea
defense, which had previously been neglected. Thus, the Imperial Court in Kyoto issued in
1846 an Imperial Message that emphasized the importance of sea defense to prevent the
intrusion of foreigners. Otsuka, Japan's Early Encounter With the Concept of the Law of
Nations, 13 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 35, 36-37 (1969).
209. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/39, at 24 (1958); Oda, Japan and the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law ofthe Sea, 3 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 65, 66 (1959).
210. Japanese See Red Over Fish, The Anchorage Times, July 31, 1976, at I, col. 2.
While the Japanese had reason to be concerned over the FCMA, their appeal, based on a
"communist threat," illustrates Japan's negotiating method. According to one noted ob-
server of Japan: "[tihe Japanese are masters of brinkmanship, stalling until the eleventh
hour before making a concession or two that mollifies their critics." Chrysler, Japan: US
Must Stay Strong, Stay Put, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Nov. 15, 1976, at 73. Regard-
less of the Japanese choice of negotiating tactics, they are successful. The FCMA favored
nations with a tradition of fishing within the FCZ. See notes 129, 140 supra.
211. The Anchorage Times, supra note 210. Japan quickly considered relief measures to
assist the industry's 490,000 fishermen after the FCMA. The measures included retraining
fishermen or other jobs and low-interest loans to fishermen operating within the FCZ to help
defray new fishing fees. Japan- Pinched Between 200-Mile Limits, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD
REPORT, Feb. 28, 1977, at 70. It has been estimated that 100,000 Japanese workers will lose
their jobs if Japanese fishing within the FCZ is completely prohibited. Ouchi, A Perspective
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much for you to understand how deeply we are shocked 2 ' 2 and
afraid of what will happen from the new fisheries law and the 200-
mile limit.
2 13
Traditional international law of the sea has furthered Japanese
interests by guaranteeing the freedoms of navigation, scientific re-
search and fishing on the high seas. However, the recent expansion
of claims has seriously restricted the traditional Japanese freedom
of fishing on the high seas.
For instance, in 1977 Japan's total fish catch was approxi-
mately 10.8 million tons, with twenty-five percent of this total being
caught by the distant-water fishing fleet. 214 In 1975 approximately
thirty-six percent of Japan's total catch was caught in waters which
would be included in the 200-mile zones of foreign countries if ex-
212. The Japanese delegate may have intentionally used the word "shock" to describe
their concern over the FCMA. The FCMA reminded them of the two Nixon "shokku,"
described from a Japanese view as follows:
On July 15, 1971, without consulting Japan in advance, President Nixon suddenly
announced his plan to visit Peking. This was a great shock to the conservative
Japanese leadership, which had been closely coordinating its China policy with the
United States. After all, the United States had made Japan sign a peace treaty with
the Taiwan government in 1952 in a containment policy against Peking. The
United States was now proposing a rapproachment with Peking 'over the head of
Japan.' In a similarly abrupt way, Nixon announced his New Economic Policy a
month later, suspending the convertibility of good into dollars and imposing a 10
percent surcharge on imports. While these two Nixon 'shokku' were not aimed at
Japan alone, they did affect Japan most severely, and the manner in which these
actions were taken reduced America's credibility in the eyes of most Japanese, in-
cluding the conservative government elites.
Sato, United States - Japanese Relations. A Japanese View, 68 CURRENT HIST. 154, 157
(April 1975).
The "Nixon shocks" of 1971 were criticized by experts in United States-Japan relations
as heavy-handed, insensitive, and would weaken relations between Washington and Tokyo.
One author, however, has argued that Washington administer a selective "shokku" to nudge
the Japanese toward cooperation on such vital issues as trade and defense where the United
States has given more than it has received. Such "[Blluntness would give the Japanese op-
portunities to resolve outstanding issues they know they ought to cope with but find them-
selves unable to explain in terms the Japanese public can accept." On selected issues "[Tihe
Japanese government may secretly welcome strong foreign pressures. It could provide a
needed excuse for doing what they would like to do if they thought they could get away with
it back home." Olsen, When Ties with Japan Need a Little Shock, The Christian Science
Monitor, July 10, 1980.
213. The Anchorage Times, supra note 210.
214. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 204, at 55-56. Future relations between
Japan and the United States may be characterized as diplomacy by shock. One observer of
Japanese-United States relations has noted that the 1980's and 1990's will witness the emer-
gence of a politically independent Japan. Strong nationalist policies will occasionally lead
Japan to take positions on significant issues that are not consistent with those of the United
States. For an interesting discussion on the issues. facing Japan-United States relations see
Shapiro, The lien Sun.- Japanese Gaullism?, 41 FOR. POL. 62 (1980-81).
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clusive fishery zones were adopted on a world-wide basis.215
B. The Japanese Position
Immediately after Japan was admitted to the international
community216 they declared that the principle of freedom of the
open seas should be respected. Japan formally adopted a three-
mile limit of territorial waters in 1870.
The expansion of offshore jurisdiction since World War II has
been consistently opposed by Japan. At the 1958 Law of the Sea
Conference, Japan warned that unilaterally determining the width
of territorial waters would produce anarchy in ocean affairs. The
Japanese delegate to the Convention stated:
The claims made by some States that each State is free to deter-
mine unilaterally the width of its territorial waters to meet its
own needs certainly cannot be reconciled with the basic princi-
ples of international law, and such claims would have no validity
in the eyes of international law. If such practices were permitted,
it would inevitably bring about a state of chaos and anarchy in
the regime of the territorial sea.217
Japan also argued against the right of coastal States to establish a
fishing monopoly zone distinct from fishing rights within the terri-
torial sea. The Japanese delegate stated the Japanese position as
follows: "[T]he Japanese delegation cannot accept any proposal
which will provide the coastal States with exclusive fishing rights
beyond the limits of territorial sea." '218
At the Third Law of the Sea Conference Japan identified three
reasons why the proposed exclusive economic zone was unaccept-
able. First, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone deprives other
215. Yanai & Asomura, Japan and the Emerging Order of the Sea- Two Maritime Laws
of Japan, 21 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 48, 49 n.3 (1977).
216. The appearance of four "Kuro-fune" (black ships) led by Commodore M. Perry of
the United States Fleet, East India, on July 8, 1853 at the Bay of Tokyo ushered in an era of
Japan's participation in the family of nations and introduced Japan to the concept of the law
of nations. Otsuka, supra note 208, at 35.
Japan's encounter with western legal systems has not led to the complete adoption of
western law in Japan. For an interesting discussion on the Japanese view toward law see
Kim & Lawson, The Law of the Subtle Mind" The Traditional Japanese Conception of Law,
28 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 491 (1979).
217. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/39, at 24 (1958); Oda, supra note 209, at 67.
218. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/39, at 149 (1958); Oda, supra note 209, at 69.
Among the various proposals in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the extent of the terri-
torial sea, in which nation's exercise complete sovereignty, were some which attempted to
recognize fishing monopoly zones of the coastal State beyond its territorial sea. For example,
Canada proposed a zone of twelve miles reserved to coastal State's for their exclusive fishing.
Japan voted against the Canadian proposal, which was rejected. Id. at 68-69.
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States of their legitimate right to fish in a very extensive area of the
sea. 219 Second, the proposals inequitably favor those countries with
long coastlines or those in proximity to rich fishing grounds. Fi-
nally, the recognition of exclusive fishing rights within an EEZ
would not promote effective conservation and management of liv-
ing ocean resources. 22' Therefore Japan's strategies in interna-
tional negotiations were: (1) to stop the 200-mile economic zone
and attempt to keep the high sea as close as possible to the twelve-
mile territorial sea; (2) to retain coastal jurisdiction within territo-
rial waters and provide for the conservation and management of
living ocean resources under an international, regional or bilateral
regime; and (3) to protect Japan's traditional fishing rights.
22 1
Japan proposed that international and regional fishery com-
missions could provide appropriate forums to devise cooperative
arrangements for fishery conservation and management. Japan
prefers to work through international organizations to negotiate
fishery policies because the snail-like pace of the negotiations
would keep the high seas open to Japan's vast distant-water fishing
fleet until an international agreement is reached. Japan's prefer-
ence for solving international fishery issues through international
conventions is expressed in the following statement:
The conservation and development of marine resources should
not be promoted by unilateral actions of the coastal countries,
and should not be settled by extending the limits of territorial
waters. It must be emphasized in this connection that the princi-
ple of distribution concerning marine resources should conform
to the traditional rules of the high seas and be dealt with at all
events through international conventions.
222
Congress, however, concluded that international management of
the living resources of the sea through bilateral treaties and multi-
219. The Japanese delegate to the ongoing LOS Conference characterized the EEZ in the
following manner: "Unfettered freedom of the high seas, where deficient, should be limited
and rectified rather than destroyed by a poor substitute. Ouchi, supra note 211, at 117.
220. Id.; see also Wells, supra note 196, at 82.
221. Ouchi, supra note 211, at 120-21.
In the Caracas Session of the LOS Conference Japan sought recognition of its tradi-
tional rights as a distant-water fishing nation. The Japanese delegate stated:
Fish had long been a necessity for the survival of the Japanese people because of
the limited agricultural and livestock-raising potential of Japanese territory, and
the Japanese population had also depended on fish and fish products for the major
part of their protein supply. Fishing would therefore continue to be vital to his
country regardless of the overall development of its national economy. The solu-
tion reached at the Conference, if it was to be viable and generally acceptable, must
provide for protection and due respect for traditional fishing rights.
Id. at 120.
222. Ohira, supra note 195, at 18.
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lateral commissions had failed.223 Therefore, it was United States
policy that the coastal State should exercise exclusive authority to
develop and implement conservation and management plans for
off-shore fisheries.
Despite Japan's efforts at the Third Law of the Sea Conference
to block the EEZ concept, the majority of nations, including land-
locked and geographically disadvantaged States, reached agree-
ment on 200-mile economic zones giving coastal nations exclusive
rights over living and non-living resources. The Japanese govern-
ment acknowledged the growing international acceptance of the
EEZ and stated:
The establishment of a sea area of 200 nautical miles from the
shore, in some meaning or another, will be unavoidable. The
situation is severe for Japan, which stands in a solitary posi-
tion... There are only two alternatives, that is, to push the ral-
lying together of like-minded countries, whose positions are
rather close to that of Japan, and to undermine the majority
opinion, or to jump into the majority and find a way by which
we can survive among them. . . . [the assertion that] our coun-
try's vested fishing rights should be recognized [is no longer ac-
ceptable, and so] [t]here is no other way but to push the work of
winning friends, by taking the direction of recognizing the inter-
ests of the other side, while protecting our own interests,
too. .... 224
Japan, therefore, sought to limit EEZ's to developing coastal States
only.
[W]e must recognize that the infant coastal fisheries, particularly
of developing countries, are seldom in a position to compete on
equal terms with the distant water fisheries of developed coun-
tries. We therefore consider that it is amply justifiable to recog-
nize, as a general principle, that developing coastal states will be
entitled, in the waters adjacent to the twelve-mile limit from the
coast, to preferential fishing rights which will ensure them an al-
location of resources in terms of the maximum annual catch that
is attainable on the basis of their individual fishing capacity...
[P]referential fishing rights should be recognized for the coastal
states to help promote expansion of the fishing industry in devel-
oping countries, and also to minimize or redress certain disrup-
tive socioeconomic effects of competition on the small-scale
223. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1801(a)(4) (West Supp. 1980) states in pertinent part the Congression-
al finding that "International fishery agreements have not been effective in preventing or
terminating the overfishing of these valuable fishery resources."
224. Wells, supra note, 196, at 83-84.
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fisheries of developed coastal states.22 5
Japan defined the term "maximum fishing capacity" as:
In other words, a developing coastal state will be assured of a
preferential share in the allocation of fishery resources according
to its maximum fishing capacity, not only as it is now but also
with some reasonable allowance for its future growth. If, how-
ever, the existing capacity is already large enough to enable the
coastal fisheries to account for a major portion (e.g., more than
50%) of the allowable catch of the stock of a fish concerned, the
preferential catch will be determined on the basis of the existing
capacity without taking into account the possibility of its future
expansion. This limitation on the preferential catch is consid-
ered reasonable inasmuch as reconciliation of interests will have
to be made of coastal and distant-water fisheries.
226
Japan was prepared to grant developing coastal States preference in
offshore fisheries only up to fifty percent of the catch. The proposal
was not supported by either the developing coastal States or the
international community at large.
The United States enactment of the FCMA provided a prece-
dent for similar claims by Japan's neighbors, the Soviet Union,
South Korea, North Korea, the People's Republic of China, and
Canada. Unilateral action by the United States227 and the Soviet
Union 228 were especially harmful to Japan, since in 1975 fishing off
the coasts of the United States and the Soviet Union represented
approximately three-fourths of the Japanese catch made within 200
miles off the coasts of foreign countries.
229
By 1977 Japan's distant-water fishing fleets were operating
within a decreasing sphere of open ocean. Japan was pinched be-
tween 200-mile claims by neighboring countries and her coastal
fisheries were increasingly fished by foreign fishing fleets. These
circumstances led Japan to begin fishery talks with the Soviet
225. Ouchi, supra note 211, at 118.
226. Id. at 119.
227. A professor of law at Seinan Gakuin University, Fukuoka, Japan summarized Japa-
nese feelings toward the United States over the enactment of the FCMA in the following
manner: "It was a matter of great disappointment for the Japanese people that their closest
political ally, which was well aware of the importance of the living resources within the
alleged 200-mile zone for the well-being of the Japanese, should take such a unilateral ac-
tion." Id. at 108. The same author also stated: "Public sentiment in Japan has become
especially bitter toward the United States for such an allegedly unfriendly act
[FCMA] .. ." Id. at 130.
228. For a discussion on Soviet views on ocean affairs see generally Carlson, Soviet Policy
on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean floor, 1 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & CoM. 104 (1972).
229. Yonezawa & Suda, supra note 30, at 173. The following table illustrates Japan's.
traditional dependence upon fishing in Soviet and American waters.
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Union in March, 1977. The talks deadlocked and the Japanese
government enacted the "Law on Provisional Measures Relating to
the Fishing Zone" in November, 1977, which established Japan's
own 200-mile fishing zone. 230 The purpose of the law was to pro-
vide a way out of the diplomatic impasse by placing Japan on a
more or less equal footing with the Soviet Union in regard to juris-
In waters within 200 miles off the Catch Ratio
coasts of foreign countries (unit: 1,000t) (per cent)
U.S.A. 1,410
U.S.S.R. 1,396







2. In waters within 200 miles off the
coasts of Japan 5,503 52
3. In waters beyond 200 miles 326 3
Total Catch in sea waters 9,573 91
Total Catch of Japan (including
catch in inland waters and marine
culturing) 10,545 100
Source: Fishery Agency of Japan (as of April 1977)
Reprinted in Yanai & Asomura, supra note 215, at 73. The United States, however, does not
harvest any living resources within the coastal waters of Japan.
Catch by Foreign Fishing Vessels in Waters within 200 miles off the Coasts of Japan
(estimates for recent years)
Catch (unit: 1,000t)
U.S.S.R. About 300-400





Source: Fishery Agency of Japan (as of April 1977)
Id. at 74.
230. Id. at 66. The law is a provisional measure only designed to protect Japanese coas-
tal fisheries pending the outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference. The FCMA has a
similar provision, see 16 U.S.C.A. § 1881 (West Supp. 1980). For a thorough discussion on
Japan's 200-mile fishing zone law see Yanai & Asomura, supra note 215, at 65-91; and Krue-
ger & Nordquist, supra note 88, at 359.
Vol. I I
51
Jones: Freedom of Fishing in Decline: The Fishery Conservation and Manag
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1981
FCMA AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR JAPAN
diction over fishery resources. The primary motivation behind
Japan's 200-mile fishing zone was the need to have a bargaining
power comparable to that of the Soviet Union in the Japan-Soviet
fishery talks.23' By creating their own 200-mile fishery jurisdiction
zone, Japan abandoned its position that "[A]ll marine resources
should be conserved for the benefit of all mankind, and not sub-
jected to the monopoly of any specific coastal State, '23 2 and joined
the international movement toward recognizing EEZ's.
The United States considers Japan's friendship and economic
growth important and valuable assets. The two nations share a mu-
tual security treaty233 and for the past several years the United
States has had more trade with Japan than with any other country
231. Yanai & Asomura, supra note 215, at 76.
232. Oda, supra note 209, at 75.
233. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 204, at 37. Article 9 of the Japanese
Constitution renounces war, forbids the possession of war potential, and denies the right of
belligerency. But it does not go so far as to negate the right of self-defense inherent in a
sovereign state or the exercise of the right of self-defense by individual countries as stipu-
lated by Article 51 of the United Nations charter. In the government's interpretation of the
Constitution, any armed action taken by Japan must be exclusively of a defensive nature,
and any overseas dispatch of its defense forces is unconstitutional. For this reason, the arma-
ments that constitute Japan's defense power are limited to those that can serve only defensive
purposes, which means that Japan cannot possess ICBM's and long-distance bombers. Thus,
as the following chart shows, Japan's defense expenditures is the lowest of any major world
power.
Defense Expenditures of Major Countries (FY 1978)
Defense Per capita Ratio to Ratio to GNP
Countries expenditures defense budget (FY 1977)
(S million) expenditures (%) (%)
(dollar)
U.S.S.R. 133,000 508 - 11-13
U.S.A. 113,000 517 23.0 6.0
China 34,380 36 - 8.5
West Germany 21,355 337 22.9 3.4
France 17,518 325 20.3 3.6
Britain 13,579 239 11.2 5.0
Saudi Arabia 13,170 1,704 35.1 13.6
Iran 9,942 273 23.8 10.9
Japan 8,567 74 5.5 0.9
Italy 5,610 98 7.9 2.4
Sources: Military Balance, 1978-79; for Japan, initial budget for FY 1978.
Reprinted in KAWAMURA, supra note 202, at 31.
The following chart illustrates the degree of Japanese support for the United States-
Japan security treaty.
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in the world,234 except its close neighbor, Canada. Regardless of
the close relationship between the two countries the United States
enacted the FCMA, and Congress is considering a fishing bill, the
American Fisheries Promotion Act of 1980, that would seriously
affect Japan.235
V. CONCLUSION
Unilateral claims to expanded offshore jurisdiction remain a
part of the traditional development of the law of the sea. The his-
tory of the law of the sea is a process of continuous interaction; of
Do you think the Japan-U.S. security treaty is helpful to Japan's peace and security?
Somewhat Not very Not Don't
Helpful helpful helpful helpful know
Total 30% 36% 8% 4% 22%
Male 39 35 8 5 13
Female 21 37 8 3 31
Age group (Male) (Male)
20-29 24 (34) 39 (36) 11 6 20
30-39 27 (35) 38 (36) 10 5 20
40-49 32 (38) 37 (37) 8 3 20
50-59 33 (42) 35 (34) 6 4 22
60 and over 33 (48) 29 (32) 4 2 32
Id. at 32.
While United States sentiment favors an expanded Japanese defense force, especially
naval, Japan could not develop the naval capability to protect the vast distances and narrow
straits her merchant fleet uses. For a general discussion on the significance of international
straits to Japan see Kuribayashi, The Basic Structure of the New Regime of Passage Through
International Straits -A n Emerging Trend in the Third UNCLOS and Japan's Situation, 21
THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF INT'L L. 29 (1977). For a discussion on defense policy in Japan
see Mendel, The Security Debate in Japan, 56 INT'L AFF. 607 (1980).
234. Economic relations between Japan and the United States are strained over the high
volume of Japanese auto imports. Japanese cars currently account for twenty-two percent of
all new cars being sold in the United States. In the small-car area, Japanese cars account for
forty percent of total United States sales. The Christian Science Monitor, July 10, 1980, at 1,
col. 3. The following public opinion poll shows the Japanese support for strong United
States-Japan ties.
Q: With which country should Japan maintain the closest relations?
U .S.A ..................................... 29%
C hina .................................... 20
All countries .............................. 14
A rab nations .............................. 2
U .S.S.R . .................................. I
South Korea .............................. I
O thers .................................... 2
Can't give a simple answer .................. 10
D on't know ............................... 19
Source: KAWAMURA, supra note 202, at 150.
235. See note 184 supra.
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continuous demand and response. It is a developing system subject
to change. Unilateral claims are advanced, the international com-
munity weighs them, and either accepts or rejects them.236 In the
balancing process nations accept or reject claims on the basis of
their national interests.237 The dialogue between Senator
Clairborne Pell and Mr. John Norton Moore during Senate hear-
ings on the FCMA illustrates that the development of the interna-
tional law of the sea is a process of protecting national interests.
Senator Pell: You are a professor of international law. Can
you recall in our country's history any incident when our na-
tional interest ran counter to international law and we followed
international law rather than our national interest?
Mr. Moore: Rather than trying to respond to that, because I
am not certain that I have any precise answer to it, I think this is
not one of those cases. I think this is a case in which both our
national interest and the international law strongly cut against
unilateral action in this bill.
Senator Pell: I regret that there is no good answer to that
question and I would hope we are merging into a world where
international law would prevail. But I wrote a book on "The
Power and Policy" and in the research I did for it I could not
find any strong evidence where a nation followed an obligation
under a treaty at the expense of its national interest.
238
An analysis of the movement toward partition of the world's
oceans into national lakes leads to the conclusion that States now
contemplating, or those who have already claimed unilateral exten-
sions of fisheries jurisdiction, are not acting as custodians over
ocean resources for the international community. Rather, these na-
tions seek to preserve for themselves a greater share of a dwindling
resource. The most effective means for accomplishing this purpose
236. International law is also developed through the treaty-making process, either
through general international agreement on a particular issue or through bilateral agree-
ments reflecting a general legal trend. MAGNUSON REPORT, supra note 112, at 5-6. For a
general discussion on the development of international law see Sohn, John A. Sibley Lecture
- The Shaping of International Law, 8 GA. J. INT'L. & CoMp. L. 1 (1978).
237. The remarks of Senator Warren Magnuson illustrate that the FCMA is a nationalis-
tic piece of legislation. Senator Magnuson stated:
[o]ff the shores of the State of Washington alone, there were 398 foreign fishing
vessels in the last few years.
If you went on a bluff, you can see them out there. What kind of business is that for
our fisheries? Fishing is a lot like agriculture. I suppose if an American farmer
found somebody using part of his pasture, he would do something about it,
wouldn't he, and particularly if they were foreigners.
Senate Hearings, supra note 27, at 77 (statement of Senator Warren Magnuson).
238. Id. at 518 (statement of Hon. John Norton Moore).
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is to join the legitimizing trend of carving out a greater portion of
adjacent ocean space for an exclusive fishing zone.
This march of individual states in a type of "Oklahoma Land
Rush"' over open ocean space has fragmented management of
ocean resources. One author has observed: "The management of
the world ocean is characterized by a haphazard quilt of global,
regional, bilateral, and national arrangements differentiated by ac-
tivity and ocean, but without effective mechanisms for achieving
coordination across either oceans or activities." 24°
Japan, as a nation highly dependent upon the seas, is feeling
the effects of this global oceanic "land rush." During the past few
years, much of Japan's former open ocean fishing grounds have
fallen to claims of extended national jurisdiction. Despite Japan's
close ties to the United States, history indicates that the United
States and other nations of the world will continue to act for their
own self interest. President Johnson warned against maritime
colonialism over ocean resources: "[U]nder no circumstances must
we ever allow the prospects of rich harvest and mineral wealth to
create a new form of colonial competition among the maritime na-
tions. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold the
lands under the high seas."24 ' The race to return to the interna-
tional law of the sixteenth centuries Papal Edict has begun. Per-
haps, the Venetian claim, asserted in the thirteenth century, should
be reinstated and respected.
239. Goldie, supra note 72, at 92.
240. Miles, The Management of the Marine Regions: The North Pacoc, 6 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L. L. vii (1979).
241. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks of the President on the Commissioning of the
New Research Ship, THE OCEANOGRAPHER (July 13, 1966); Christy, supra note 42, at 425.
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APPENDIX A: FOREIGN CATCH IN THE U.S. FISHERY
CONSERVATION ZONE - ALASKAN WATERS
1. GULF OF ALASKA: FOREIGN CATCH, BY COUNTRY AND
SPECIES, 1977-79
(Preliminary)
Country and species 1977 1978 1979
- - - Metric tons, round weight - - -
Canada:
Flounders* ................ 0.9 - -
Halibut .................... 2,171.8 2,533.3 1,085.9
Lingcod ................... .. 5 - -
Rockfishes ................. 1.8 - -
Sablefish .................. 1.8 - -
Salmon ..................... 6 - -
Turbot ..................... 9 - -
Total 2,178.3 2,533.3 1,085.9
.........................................................
Japan:
Atka, mackerel ............. . - 1,135.7 544.5
Cod, Pacific ............... 1,445.0 8,845.8 9,823.4
Flounders* ................ 18,124.0 13,809.4 12,331.7
Ocean perch, Pacific ........ - 4,547.6 7,334.0
Pollock, Alaska ............ 42,415.0 26,093.0 32,114.2
Rockfishes ................. 21,566.0 1,277.2 1,068.5
Sablefish .................. 13,886.0 6,458.3 5,866.0
Other finfish ............... 3,400.0 3,919.1 2,265.8
Squid, unclassified ......... - 185.8 260.6
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* May include yellowfin sole.
207,978.3 167,628.4 163,442.0
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric
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II. BERING SEA AND ALEUTIAN ISLANDS: FOREIGN
CATCH BY COUNTRY AND BY SPECIES, 1977-79
(Preliminary)
Country and Species 1977 1978 1979
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Grand total 1,167,985.0 1,400,673.7 1,296,197.2
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
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